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UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATION TO VOIR DIRE
PRACTICES, THE REASONABLE CROSS-SECTION
REQUIREMENT, AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
James Oldham*
In this Article, Professor Oldham provides a unique historical study
of the special, or struck, jury in the United States. First, Professor
Oldham discusses the influence of the 1730 English statute on eigh-
teenth-century American law and reviews the procedures of several
states in which the struck jury remains valid, in addition to the once-
authorized procedures that states have since declared invalid. He also
analyzes the relationship between the struck jury and peremptory chal-
lenges. Second, Professor Oldham analyzes the special qualifications of
the jurors comprising special juries in the context of the "blue ribbon,"
or "high-class, " jury, the jury of experts, and the juries for property
condemnation and diking district assessment disputes. Third, he analyzes
the relationship between the special jury and the reasonable cross-sec-
tion requirement in light of constitutional limitations on peremptory
challenges.
Professor Oldham argues that perhaps there still may be a place for
special juries and that history justifies continued experimentation with
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jury composition, including the special jury. He concludes that formulas
for selecting juries, especially those that are aimed at obtaining fair and
intelligent verdicts, have achieved historical legitimacy and should be al-
lowed a reasonable coexistence with the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement.
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I explore the history of the special jury in the United
States and relate it to two fundamental features of the institution of trial
by jury. The first is what every schoolchild learns: No one who claims to
be innocent can be sentenced to jail unless found guilty of wrongdoing
by a jury of his or her peers. The second is the requirement that the
pooled names of potential jurors used by the courts must comprise, as
nearly as possible, a reasonable cross section of the community.' A re-
quirement that a defendant's trial jury empanel a representative number
of his or her peers (taken from a class that would represent a distinct
constituent group in the community), instead of the peers merely being
present in the jury pool, could link these two concepts. This additional
step, although taken in the past and recently advocated by a few reform-
ers, has no support in contemporary jury practices.
The "jury of peers" notion has an ancient lineage that still reverber-
ates as a supposedly important part of every American's heritage. A re-
cent opinion of United States District Judge Hutton of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, disposing of a show cause order against a woman
who failed to appear for jury service, illustrates the modern, nostalgic
perception of this heritage. Judge Hutton wrote that "[t]he right to a trial
by a jury of one's peers is one of the cornerstones of the American judi-
cial system. It is a birthright cherished by generations of American citi-
zens ... ." A 1968 Supreme Court discussion of the objectives of the
framers of the federal and state constitutions similarly concluded that
1 This requirement is now a widespread feature of state and federal law. For a
thoughtful and thorough discussion of this jurisprudential "sea change," see JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY ch. 3 (1994).
In re Tiffany Green, No. 96-0222, 1996 WL 660949, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
1996). Judge Hutton then quoted language from a 1918 Arizona case about "the blood
and treasure it has cost to get and keep this birthright" and the "evils tyranny and the
lust of power have visited upon the weak and helpless who were without its protecting
aegis," after which he presented a remarkable one-page history of trial by jury across
four thousand years. Id. at *2-3 (citing Preistly v. Arizona, 171 P. 137, 138 (Ariz.
1918)).
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"[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt, or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."3 Con-
sider also the 1995 conviction of former Congressman Walter R. Tucker
III for extorting bribes while serving as Mayor of Compton, California.4
According to news reports, Tucker wrote to California Governor Pete
Wilson and to House Speaker Newt Gingrich, stating in his letter that he
"was not judged by a jury of [his] peers and ... did not receive a just
verdict."5
What did former Congressman Tucker mean? Who were the "peers"
of whom he claimed to be deprived?6 According to Henry Toulmin,
United States Judge for the Mississippi Territory and author of an 1807
book called The Magistrate's Assistant, "[tjhe fundamental principle of
this institution [trial by jury] is, that a man should be tried by his peers
or equals, a commoner by commoners and a nobleman by nobles .. .
This proposition, however, is, and for the most part always has been, a
fairy tale. Historically, we boasted about juries of our peers while ex-
cluding half the population-women-from jury service! We also fol-
lowed practices that kept racial and other minorities off juries or that left
them drastically underrepresented. In the not so distant past, the United
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
See Kathryn Wexler & William Claiborne, Rep. Tucker Convicted of Extortion,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1995, at Al.
' Greg Pierce, Inside Politics: Tucker Resigns, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A6.
The news story was distributed by United Press International on December 12, 1995.
See California Rep. Tucker Resigns, United Press International, Dec. 12, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
6 See Tucker, City News Service, Dec. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ARCNWS File. Former Congressman Tucker possibly was alluding to the racial
composition of the jury (which consisted of "seven whites, four Asian-Americans and
one African-American"), suggesting that, as an African-American, his race was unfairly
underrepresented. Id.
7 HARRY TOULMIN, THE MAGISTRATE'S ASSISTANT 140 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell
1807); see also Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841
(1976).
' In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), Justice Strong, writing the
majority opinion, stated: "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society
as that which he holds." Id. at 308. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), dissent-
ing Justice Field remarked that "no one will contend that equal protection to women, to
children, to the aged, to aliens, can only be secured by allowing persons of the class to
which they belong to act as jurors in cases affecting their interests." Id. at 367 (Field,
J., dissenting); see also LaRue, supra note 7, at 846-47.
1998] 625
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
States also maintained requirements of property ownership that excluded
the poorest segments of the economic spectrum of society.'
Both the jury of peers concept and the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement relate to jury composition procedures. They do so, however,
with sharply different objectives. As Judge Toulmin suggested, the jury
of peers notion is aimed at giving the defendant a fair trial by placing on
his jury at least a representative number of people that share the
defendant's cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or possibly socio-economic cir-
cumstances.10 Historically, this idea gave rise to the "mixed," or "half-
and-half," jury-the jury de medietate linguae (literally, "of the half-
tongue")-to which foreign defendants would have been entitled. Half of
the jury would be citizens of the state where the case was tried, while
the other half would be foreigners.' The notion was not merely to facil-
itate communication, but also, as expressed by a defendant in a seven-
teenth-century English case, to secure jurors "of my own country, that
may be able to know something how I have lived hitherto."" Occasion-
9 In People v. Ruppert, 279 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Westchester County Ct. 1967), the court
upheld a New York statute that stated that jurors must own at least 250 dollars worth of
real or personal property. According to the court:
It does not seem unreasonable in our "free society" to have a minimal ownership
in something real or personal to invest a person with the privilege of performing a
vital public function, such as being a member of the Grand Jury or Trial Jury, to
whom the free rights of individuals, as well as great public interests are commit-
ted for resolution in the respective spheres granted to these bodies by custom and
statute.
Id. at 989-99. The New York Supreme Court reached the same result in People v. Co-
hen, 283 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The Cohen court quoted an earlier opinion by
United States District Judge Medina that called a challenge to the property qualification
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "frivolous." Id. at 824 (quoting United States v.
Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197, 207 (1949)).
10 See TOULMIN, supra note 7, at 140.
For a thoughtful analytical treatment of the "half-and-half' jury, see MARIANNE
CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994). For good reviews of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century applications of the procedure in American cases, see LaRue, supra
note 7, at 850-63; Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of
Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 777, 783-89 (1994); see also Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action
in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries
of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
645 (1997); Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-
and-Half Juries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1
(1994).
" Rex v. Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 963 (K.B. 1680). According to LaRue,
Justice Field understood the jury de medietate as a mode of trial made available in
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al voices recently have echoed this idea by calling for racial or ethnic
quotas for certain types of juries. 3
The reasonable cross-section requirement, by contrast, is designed to
ensure that members of all significant, or "cognizable," segments of the
community have the opportunity to be jurors. 4 This egalitarian require-
ment pulls strongly against any procedure or tradition that would permit
the formation of juries from lists of persons with special qualifications.
One well-known example of such a jury with special qualifications is the
so-called "blue ribbon" jury, that is, the "high-class" jury. 5 Another
historical example is the jury of experts, most notably the merchant
juries that were instrumental in absorbing commercial practices into
common law.16 Both of these examples fall within the meaning of the
"special jury" as used and understood in England and in the United
States for several centuries.17
England for an alien "probably as much because of the difference of language and
customs between him and Englishmen, and the greater probability of his defense being
more fully understood, as because it would be heard in a more friendly spirit by jurors
of his own country and language." LaRue, supra note 7, at 847 (quoting Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 369 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting)). For an elaboration of the several
rationales supporting the jury de medietate, see CONSTABLE, supra note 11, ch. 6;
LaRue, supra note 7, at 852-63; Van Ness, supra note 11, at 37-39.
13 See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 11; Van Ness, supra note 11. These articles
make the explicit argument for adapting the historical de medietate practice to modern
trials that promise to be racially charged. Others argue for racial quotas in order to give
reality to the "jury of peers" and thereby to secure a fair trial. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L. J. 704 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Diane Potash, Mandato-
ry Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L. J. 80 (1973); Note, The
Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L. J. 531 (1970); see also CONSTABLE, supra note 11,
at 41-48. Ramirez uses the history of the mixed jury to argue for what she terms "affir-
mative peremptories." Ramirez, supra note 11, at 806-17; see also infra notes 255-64
and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
" See infra Part II.A.
16 The best-known example of effective use of merchant juries is that of Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench of England from 1756 to 1788.
For explanation and discussion, see I JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS
AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 93-99 (1992).
" In earlier articles, I have explored in detail the history of the special jury in Eng-
land. In these works, I gave summary descriptions of the special jury experience in the
United States and cited representative sources that have given limited attention to the
topic. See James Oldham, Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 137, 137,
138 n.6, 210 n.453 (1983) [hereinafter Oldham, Origins]; James Oldham, Special Juries
in England: Nineteenth Century Usage and Reform, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 148, 160-61
(1987) [hereinafter Oldham, Special Juries]. Because the American special jury built
directly upon the English experience, the history of the English special jury is essential
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The idea of drawing exclusive special juries from specialized lists
seems to be anachronistic today. Elite special juries surely are antitheti-
cal to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of opening up jury service to
everyone. Having eliminated the unsavory exclusions of the past, how
can there remain a place in modern American society for an exclusive
special jury?
I argue that there is still such a place-that our history justifies con-
tinued experimentation with jury composition, including the special jury.
However desirable the reasonable cross-section requirement is as a
means of keeping an increasingly stratified people personally involved in
the business of democracy, the requirement contributes little or nothing
to other goals, such as coping effectively with jury trial of complex
cases, or striving for fairness to litigating parties; yet the latter
goal-picking juries that will be fair to the parties-has long been cen-
tral to the jury selection process, especially as embodied in peremptory
challenge and voir dire practices. The Supreme Court has outlawed the
use of peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors on the basis of
race or gender as improperly discriminatory and as inconsistent with the
reasonable cross-section requirement;18 however, voir dire screening,
including the use of nondiscriminatory peremptories, continues to be the
principal method of ferreting out undesirable jurors.
The voir dire process brings into view another prominent feature of
the special jury. Historically, the term "special jury" has had two main
connotations-the jury comprised of jurors with special qualifications, as
discussed above, and the jury formed by a special procedure involving
the presentation of a large panel of potential jurors to the parties who
then reduce the panel to a specified smaller number by taking turns
striking names off the list. When this procedure is used, the resulting
jury usually is referred to as a "struck jury." Legal literature and case
law often have used this expression interchangeably with "special ju-
ry. ,, 9
In England, the special jury is now extinct. In the United States, it
survives in about a dozen states, and in most of these states, it persists
solely as a "struck jury" formation procedure." For reasons later ex-
plained, this procedure often is viewed as being fairer to criminal defen-
dants than is the peremptory challenge-the more customary device
to an understanding of the American patterns.
See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
The first significant legislative treatment of the special jury in England was in
1730. The legislature described such a procedure for jury formation, saying nothing
about who were to be the jurors. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
2 See infra Part I.A.
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designed to protect criminal defendants in jury selection.
The other goal mentioned above--coping effectively with jury trial of
complex cases--encourages the use of a jury of experts, the modem ana-
logue of the merchant jury. Here, too, recent voices have called for the
revival or extension of this type of special jury.21 In actual practice,
Delaware is the only state where this occurs, as I will later show.'
Part I of this Article discusses the history and current validity of the
struck jury in both civil and criminal cases and deals with the relation
between struck jury procedures and peremptory challenges. Part II ex-
plores the history and current validity of special juries in which jurors
have special qualifications. Part III comments on the relation between the
special jury and the reasonable cross-section requirement, especially as
reflected in recent Supreme Court cases and other federal cases dealing
with peremptory challenges based solely on "protected group" charac-
teristics such as race and sex.
I. THE STRUCK JURY
It is helpful at the outset to understand the relationship between
"struck jury" procedures and the jury composed of jurors with special
qualifications. Usually there is no official or formal connection. Eigh-
teenth-century American statutes authorizing the special jury typically
approved and set out a struck jury procedure, but said nothing about
empaneling jurors of special qualities or characteristics. Most of the
American statutes followed the 1730 English statute.' The English stat-
ute, after noting that some doubt had arisen about the power of the cen-
tral courts "to appoint Juries to be struck" before the appropriate officers
in the several courts, confirmed that such power existed and provided
that, on motion by any party in any civil case or in the prosecution of
any misdemeanor, juries could be struck "in such manner as special
juries have been, and are usually struck in such courts respectively upon
trials at bar had in the said courts, which said jury so struck as aforesaid,
shall be the jury returned for the trial of the said issue."' The statute
excluded trials of capital offenses (felonies) in order to preserve
defendants' peremptory challenges.'
21 See Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the
Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 575 (1990); Note, The Case
for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L. J. 1155 (1980).
2 See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text.
2 An Act for the Better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 15 (1730) (Eng.).
24 Id.
2' Id. § 20. Each defendant in a capital case was entitled to thirty-five peremptory
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The 1730 English statute said nothing about who the special jurors
should be, except for one provision that called for the proper officer to
bring into court the books or lists of qualified jurors from which to
choose the jury panel.26 The statute did, however, adopt for everyday
trials the model of the special jury as it had been used in trials at bar.
The trial at bar was a jury trial conducted before the full bench of four
justices. In writing his Commentaries in the 1760s, Blackstone claimed
that special juries were "originally introduced in trials at bar, when the
causes were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freehold-
ers."'27 Dozens of American cases have quoted this language in explain-
ing the special jury.'
It is not at all clear that Blackstone fully understood the seventeenth-
and early-eighteenth-century uses of the special jury,29 but he was es-
sentially correct in associating the special jury with "big cases"-those
tried at bar. In the early 1700s, the trial at bar was commonly allowed in
cases involving especially difficult questions, parties of high station in
government or society, or a substantial amount of money.' By the time
Parliament passed the special jury statute, the Court of King's Bench
was trying to limit the costly and inefficient trial at bar,31 but whenever
trials at bar were granted, they typically were tried by special juries.
Who were the special jurors in trials at bar? If the issues were "of
too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders," presumably
there must have been some way to select "extraordinary freeholders" as
jurors." Evidence of quarrels about who the special jurors should be
exists even in trials at bar. In a case decided in 1710, the Solicitor Gen-
eral argued, on a motion for a special jury in a trial at bar, that the Sher-
iff would be obliged "to return gentlemen of the better [rank," but Jus-
tice Eyre of the Court of Queen's Bench observed that "[i]n a trial at bar
challenges. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
347 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1769).
26 See 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 17 (1730) (Eng.). Country juries would have been selected
from the Freeholders' Book, but in the sixteenth century, Parliament recognized that
there were too few freeholders in cities and towns to supply jurors, so the legislators
fashioned a property qualification in personalty for these venues. See Oldham, Origins,
supra note 17, at 211-13.
27 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357-58
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1768).
' See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 228-32; cf. infra text accompanying notes
121-22.
29 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 177-84.
30 See id. at 192-94.
See id. at 194 (citing Goodright v. Wood, 94 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1728)).
32 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 357-58.
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the jury is returned by the Master. The jury is special only because it is
returned in a special manner, it is no objection that a man is a common
juror."
33
Justice Eyre's remarks notwithstanding, it is clear that special jurors
in the early-eighteenth-century English trials at bar were "gentlemen of
the better [r]ank."' Exactly how this was accomplished is somewhat of
a mystery. The empaneling officer probably had favored names that he
could choose out of the jury book; counsel possibly had their own choic-
es; and separate lists of special jurors may have been maintained.35
When Parliament passed the 1730 statute, it specified merely that
special juries were to be formed in such manner as special juries had
been struck in trials at bar. This directive appears to have been procedur-
al, and by 1730 the practice was well-established. The proper court offi-
cer would produce the jury book (usually referred to as "the Freeholders'
Book" even if some or all of those on the list were personalty-holders36)
from which forty-eight names would be chosen.37 These forty-eight
names would be reduced to a panel of twenty-four names by alternate
strikes by counsel for plaintiff and defendant. The Sheriff then would
summon the twenty-four persons to attend as trial jurors in the hope that
at least twelve of them would show up at trial.3" This procedure may
well have been all that Parliament had in mind by .its reference to the
manner of striking special jurors in trials at bar. Nevertheless, because
special jurors "of the better Rank" had become customary in trials at bar,
the special jury came to be thought of as regularly composed of such
persons, even when the trial was not at bar.39 This fact is important in
understanding the adoptions of the special jury in America. In 1741, for
example, New York enacted a statute that copied Parliament's 1730
statute and declared that "his Maje[s]ty's Supreme Court of this Colony"
could, upon motion:
order and appoint a jury, to be struck, before one of the
Judges of the said Court, for trial of any issue joined in any
13 Regina v. Harcourt (Q.B. 1710), Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard Law School MS
1142, at 190. For a discussion of this case, see Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 200-
02. The "Master" referred to the Secondary, an officer of the Court of Queen's (or
King's) Bench.
3' Harcourt, Harvard Law School MS 1142, at 187.
For speculation about these possibilities, see Oldham, Special Juries, supra note
17, at 153-58; I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 96-97.
36 See supra note 26.
37 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 358.
38 See id.
'9 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 202.
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of the said cases, and triable by a jury of twelve men, in
such manner as special juries have by law heretofore been
struck, for trials at bar; which jury, so struck, as aforesaid,
shall be the jury returned for the trial of the said issue.4"
As we shall see, the New York statutory treatment of the special jury
changed after statehood, but the notion that special jurors were jurors "of
the better rank" persisted.
The heritage thus was one of a statutorily endorsed struck jury proce-
dure that said nothing about who the special jurors should be, yet was un-
dergirded by a custom of filling the special jury with upper-class gentlemen.
By the time of American independence, the custom had expanded so that in
commercial cases, special juries of merchants were commonplace.4
Against this background, I turn to the struck jury as it took root and
prospered in the United States. The formulas in the several states, even in
the eighteenth century, were by no means uniform. Clusters of states, how-
ever, followed similar patterns, especially as the statutory adoptions spread
westward in the nineteenth century. In the discussion that follows, I provide
representative examples of special jury enactments, including references to
formulations in the states in which the special jury survives.
A. Representative State Patterns: States in Which the Special Jury Remains
Valid
There are about a dozen states in which the special, or "struck,". jury
remains on the books. 2 In several of these, the struck jury procedure is
used in criminal cases because it is viewed as allowing a voir dire superior
40 Act of Nov. 27, 1741, ch. DCCXX, N.Y. Colonial Laws (encouraging the return
of able and sufficient jurors, as well as the better regulation of juries).
41 See I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 95-96. A special jury of merchants was not a
matter of right. See id.
42 I refer to states in which the struck jury originated by statute. As is noted later,
there are other states in which trial judges adopted the struck jury method without statu-
tory authorization. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07. There are also instances
of the adoption of the method by court rules. I have not attempted to canvas federal,
state, and local trial courts to discover struck jury usages in states in which there is no
statutory history supporting the practice. For a description of the adoption of the struck
jury method by court rule, see State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 614 (Idaho 1991). After
referring to a 1961 case in which a new trial was granted because the struck jury meth-
od used by the trial court was at odds with statutory requirements, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that the struck jury procedure followed by the trial court had been made
available by court rule. See id. For a recent challenge to many Idaho trial judges' prac-
tice of placing time limits on attorney voir dire during struck jury selection, see State v.
Larsen, 923 P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1996).
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to the "jury box" method.43 Indeed, as I will explain, this perceived superi-
ority led Hawaii trial judges to use the struck jury method in the face of a
contrary statutory mandate.
In three states-Delaware, Virginia, and Alabama-the special or struck
jury continues to be regarded as a significant part of the jury trial heritage.
The approaches in the three states, however, are very different, and each
requires explanation.
Delaware is a special jury laboratory. Constitutional challenges to the
special jury have been unsuccessful in Delaware, and the current statute is
the only one in the nation that overtly authorizes the use of the special jury
for complex civil litigation. This authorization is a recent development; the
early history began in 1793 when the Delaware legislature passed "[a]n Act
for more certainly obtaining returns of impartial juries, and their better regu-
lation."" That statute gave the sheriff directions about what to do with the
return of the venire facias, "unless in cases where a special jury shall be
struck by rule of court." '45 A "rule of court" was a court order, and thus it
is clear that informal special jury usage was in place in Delaware during the
eighteenth century.
The first detailed statutory recognition of this usage came in an 1810
act, which provided that a struck jury was required on application of either
party "in any action, cause or suit whatsoever" in the Supreme Court or the
Court of Common Pleas.46 According to the Delaware Supreme Court in
Nance v. Rees,47 the 1810 act could be traced to the English statute Of
1730, and "the Act of 1810 did no more than codify into statutory law a
practice long followed in Delaware courts as a part of the legal heritage
from England."48 Open to question, however, was whether the procedure
applied to criminal as well as civil cases. In Rush v. State,49 a defendant in
a murder case claimed that his request at trial for a special jury should have
been granted, but the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that "[t]he
legislative history of the Delaware special jury statute, from its inception in
1810, indicates that special juries were to be confined to courts of civil
jurisdiction."5
4 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
" Act of Feb. 2, 1793, Del. Laws ch. VIII (1793).
45 Id.
46 Act of Jan. 30, 1810, Del. Laws ch. CXX (1810).
47 161 A.2d 795 (Del. 1960).
48 Id. at 799.
4' 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985).
O Id. at 443. The Delaware Supreme Court quoted the trial judge in pointing out
that special juries originally had been authorized only for courts of civil jurisdic-
tion-the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas-and not for the criminal
courts (the court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and the court of
General Quarter Sessions of the Peace and Gaol Delivery). See id. at 443 n. 3.
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The formula specified in the 1810 statute was one that is now famil-
iar-forty-eight freeholders "most indifferent" and "best qualified," to be
reduced to twenty-four by alternating strikes by the parties.5 With compar-
atively minor adjustments, this formula persisted in Delaware for 177 years.
In 1987, however, Delaware repealed the statute and replaced it with a
single paragraph, which opens with the following sentence: "The court may
order a special jury upon the application of any party in a complex civil
case."52 The methodology for empaneling special juries under this law is
left, apparently, to court rules or to the ad hoc invention of trial judges. 3
Substantively, the two major changes were the conversion from special
juries as a matter of right (as they had been under the 1810 statute) to one
of court discretion, and the limitation of special juries to complex civil
cases.
Both the traditional struck jury statute and the succinct 1987 version
survived constitutional challenge during the 1980s. Because both challenges
were based largely on claimed conflict between the Delaware practice of
maintaining a separate list of jurors for special juries and the reasonable
cross-section requirement, discussion is deferred to Parts II and III, be-
low. 4
In Virginia, the first statutory appearance of the struck jury appears to
have been in 1788 for impeachment trials. The statute provided for the
sheriff to return a panel of twenty-four jurors from the senatorial district
where the accused resided; then "[t]he prosecutor for the commonwealth,
and the person accused, shall, in open Court, alternately strike one, until the
number shall be reduced to twelve . . ,5" The general availability of the
struck jury entered the statute books much later. The Code of 1849 provided
that a trial jury would be formed by reducing a panel of twenty-four to
eighteen by lot, after which the eighteen would be reduced to twelve by
alternate strikes by the parties.56 In 1887, however, the Virginia Code was
changed to provide: "Any court, in a case where a jury is required, may
allow a special jury."57 The procedure was to summon a panel of twenty
qualified jurors, to choose sixteen of them by lot, and to reduce the sixteen
Act of Jan. 30, 1810, Del. Laws ch. CXX (1810). The statute also provided that
in civil cases in which the jury was empaneled according to the 1793 statute, each side
was to be allowed three peremptory challenges. See id.
52 66 DEL. LAwS ch. 5, § 4506 (1987).
"' See Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL
28311 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987) (granting part of the motion for summary judg-
ment in the libel action); see also infra text accompanying note 249.
54 See infra notes 224-32, 288-91 and accompanying text.
55 Act of Dec: 2, 1788, 1788 Va. Acts ch. 67, § 128 (establishing district courts and
regulating the general court).
56 See VA. CODE OF 1849, ch. 162, § 8.
-57 VA. CODE OF 1887, ch. 152, § 3158.
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to twelve by alternate strikes by the parties. This formula remained until
1950, when Virginia moved to smaller juries for most cases and adopted the
struck jury across the board.5" The 1950 Code specified that juries in minor
civil cases (up to one thousand dollars in controversy) should be five jurors
out of a panel of eleven; in other civil cases the jury was to be seven out of
a panel of thirteen, "except that when a special jury is allowed, twelve per-
sons from a panel of twenty shall constitute the jury."59 In all cases, alter-
nate strikes by the parties were to reduce the panel to the number of jurors
for the applicable jury.
The jury provisions of the Code of 1950 remain in place today, except
for an increase in the jurisdictional limit for the five-person civil jury from
one thousand to fifteen thousand dollars.60 The only difference between
ordinary civil juries and special juries in civil cases is the size of the jury
panel and the jury itself. Nothing in the statutory language or case law indi-
cates that special jurors are to be persons of special qualifications.6 Anoth-
er provision of the Code of 1950 (still in effect), however, permits the par-
ties to create a jury of three members by consent. The plaintiff selects one
juror, the defendant selects a second, and the two jurors in turn select a
third, and "any two concurring shall render a verdict in like manner and
with like effect as a jury of seven."62 Although not a struck jury, this jury-
by-consent is a special jury in the sense that it is formed by a special proce-
dure. What the jury-by-consent most resembles is arbitration.63
58 The current statutory references are, for civil cases, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-362
(Michie 1997) ("Any court in a civil case in which a jury is required may allow a spe-
cial jury, in which event . .. a jury shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
§ 8.01-359A."), and for criminal cases, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262(C) (Michie 1997)
("The parties or their counsel ... shall alternately strike off one name from the panel
until the number remaining shall be reduced to the number required for a jury.").
59 VA. CODE OF 1950, § 8-208.21.
60 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359A (Michie 1997); see supra note 59.
61 In an early case, Atlantic & Danville R.R. Co. v. Peake, 87 Va. 130 (1890), the
court disallowed a special jury because there was nothing in the case suggesting preju-
dice or exceptional difficulty. This case suggests that cases of exceptional difficulty
qualify for special juries, and further, that the jurors would be specially qualified. I have
had no opportunity to investigate whether such a practice in Virginia courts is called for
in court rules or is followed informally.
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359D (Michie 1997).
63 During the eighteenth century in England, it was common to refer pending court
cases to arbitration, and one or some number of jurors would at times be chosen to be
the arbitrators. More commonly, arbitrators with expertise in the subject matter in dis-
pute would be selected. If the number of arbitrators chosen were an even number, there
would customarily be a provision for the named arbitrators to select an umpire for tie-
breaking purposes. See I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 151-55; II id. app. E. There are
examples of naming two arbitrators with instructions to them to choose a third. See
Hotchkin v. Cotes, Nisi Prius (Trinity Feb. 15, 1758) (Radford and Sweet, Arb.), cited
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Alabama uses the struck jury in both criminal and civil cases. The origi-
nal 1841 statutory authorization in Alabama for struck juries applied to civil
cases "sounding in damages merely" or involving more than one hundred
dollars.' Alternate strikes were to reduce panels of twenty-four persons to
twelve. 65 Alabama later expanded this authorization to "all civil actions
triable by jury, '' 66 an expansion that is still in operation. 67 The Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, which control all Alabama courts except district
courts, codify the same procedure.68 The struck jury method of Rule 47(b)
superseded the older method of peremptory challenges that was available in
civil cases for which no special jury was selected.69
Meanwhile, early in this century, the struck jury procedure was made
applicable to criminal cases.7" A sliding scale was fashioned so that a panel
of at least thirty-six is required for capital offenses, twenty-four for non-
capital felonies, and eighteen for misdemeanors. This scheme supplanted
peremptory challenges in criminal trials.71 Constitutional attacks on the
statutes applying the struck jury to criminal cases have failed.72
Other states in which the struck jury remains valid by statute include
South Carolina, Indiana, Arkansas, Maryland, and West Virginia.73 Use of
the method of striking jurors in lieu of peremptories, without calling the
result a struck jury, is codified in Arizona and Texas. In addition, there is
evidence that the method is used pursuant to court rules in Massachusetts
in II OLDHAM, supra note 16, app. E, at 1544. These practices became common in
American colonies and states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The experience
with arbitration in colonial America and in the early republic was extensive, but it is
inadequately documented. I have amassed materials that illuminate that experience, but
at present they are in unpublished form. For an excellent study of arbitration in colonial
Connecticut, see Bruce Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984).
6 ALA. CODE OF 1841, ch. 10, § 52.
65 See id.
66 ALA. CODE OF 1932, Ex. Sess., at 34.
67 See ALA. CODE § 12-16-140 (1997); see also Wallace v. Alabama Power Co., 497
So. 2d 450 (Ala. 1986).
68 See ALA. R. CIv. P. 47(b).
69 For an explanation of superseding peremptories, see the Committee Comments to
the 1973 promulgation of Rule 47; see also Holman v. Baker, 169 So. 2d 429 (Ala.
1964).
' Act of Sept. 29, 1919, 1919 Ala. Acts No. 715. For current statutory provisions,
see ALA. CODE § 12-16-100 (1995) and Rule 18.4(f) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
71 See Brown v. State, 231 So. 2d 167 (Ala. App. 1970).
71 See Dixon v. State, 167 So. 340 (Ala. App. 1936).
7 See supra note 42 for the method I followed in identifying states with current
special jury practices.
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and that it has been employed by trial judges as a matter of personal prefer-
ence in Alaska and Hawaii.
The South Carolina experience with the special jury has been unique in
its explicit use of merchant juries in the eighteenth century. 74 A 1769 stat-
ute authorized special juries in the Charleston Court of Common Pleas, if
consented to by both parties in a case involving trade or considerable mon-
ey, or between merchants.' Although the statute referred to ordering "a
special jury to be struck," the method of juror selection was by ballot-
ing-either from lists of potential jurors that the parties supplied (for trials
at bar of causes "of weight and importance") or from regular jury lists.'
The legislature later observed that the 1769 plan sometimes resulted in spe-
cial juries "drawn entirely out of the number of those whose names were
given in or delivered to the court by one of the parties in controver-
sy .... , 77 South Carolina thus changed the law in 1791 to a complicated
formula, applicable on consent of both parties, on request of either party, or
at the court's discretion in big money cases.78 The gist of the formula was
that each party supplied eighteen names of qualified grand jurors; then each
party was to strike ten names from the other party's list and identify two
names from the twenty rejects to serve as "talesmen" (back-up jurors), if
needed. This resulted in a panel of twenty names to be summoned for tri-
al. 79 Five years later, this act was repealed, and the next year, the right to a
special jury was abolished "except by consent of both parties" because the
device had been found to have been "abused to the purposes of delay and
chicanery."80 When both parties consented, however, the 1791 procedure
still could be used.
There were other legislative adjustments over time, and during the pres-
ent century, the South Carolina legislature adopted a straightforward struck
jury approach. The current version calls for the clerk in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas to supply a list of twenty jurors from "the whole number of
jurors who are in attendance," and then alternate strikes will reduce this list
to the trial jury of twelve persons."
74 See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
71 See Act of July 29, 1769, 1769 S.C. Acts, No. 1095, sec. XXIII ("establishing
courts, building gaols, and appointing sheriffs and other officers, and for the more con-
venient administration of justice in this province").
76 See id.
77 See Act of Dec. 20, 1791, 1791 S.C. Acts, No. 1526 ("to alter and amend the
Law Respecting Juries and to make some additional regulation to the Acts for establish-
ing and regulating the Circuit Courts").
71 See id.
71 See id.
' Act of Dec. 16, 1797, 1797 S.C. Acts No. 1665.
8' S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1050 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
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The nineteenth-century statutory authorization of special juries in Indi-
ana began with the simple declaration that "[t]he Court shall have the pow-
er, when the business thereof requires it, to order the impaneling of a spe-
cial jury for the trial of any cause."82 This was accompanied by a provision
captioned "Jury by agreement," allowing the parties to "agree upon the ju-
rors to compose a special jury, and notify the Court thereof ... ,,." Alterna-
tively, the parties were allowed to have a "struck jury, by consent," formed
by a return by the sheriff of eighteen competent jurors, reduced to a jury of
six via six strikes by each party-or any other number of strikes the parties
might choose.' When the court ordered a struck jury, the Indiana formula
was for a panel of the forty "most indifferent" and "best qualified" men to
be returned, with each party's twelve strikes reducing the panel to sixteen. 5
Amendments in 1913 deleted the language calling for the clerk to select
forty men "most indifferent" and "best qualified," substituting instructions
for the clerk to take forty names from a well-shaken box containing the
names of qualified ordinary jurors.86 In 1988, Indiana repealed the provi-
sions allowing the court to order struck juries, but the sections described
above allowing a special jury by agreement or a struck jury by consent
remain intact.8 7
The remnant of the struck jury in Arkansas is evident in statutes grant-
ing each party three peremptory challenges. In criminal misdemeanor cases,
each side has three peremptories that can be exercised orally, after which
the names of twenty-four jurors are put in a box, eighteen names are drawn
and entered on a list, each side strikes up to three names, and the first
twelve names remaining constitute the jury.' In civil cases the formula is
similar, but the process of striking from a list of eighteen names drawn from
twenty-four is optional. Previously the state utilized a more typical struck
jury method; on the request of either party, the circuit court had discretion
to order a panel of forty-two names to be returned, which after each party's
twelve strikes would be reduced to eighteen names.9°
82 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Homer, § 522. The 1896 compilation is the earliest set of
Indiana statutes to which I have had access. Later historical annotations show that the
special jury provisions originated in "An Act concerning proceedings in civil cases."
1881 Ind. Acts 240, ch. 38, §§ 357-362.
83 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Horner, § 523.
' 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Homer, § 524.
85 Id. § 525.
86 1913 Ind. Acts ch. 15, § 1.
87 The repealing authority was 1988 Ind. Acts, P.L.180-1988, § 2. For the retained
provisions in the current statutes, see IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-19-2 (Michie Supp. 1986)
("Special jury by agreement") and id. § 34-1-19-3 ("Struck jury-By consent").
8 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-203 (Michie 1997).
89 See id. § 16-33-203 (Michie 1994).
' See ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 20-21 (1837). The statute had an interesting,
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Maryland used the struck jury method for nearly two centuries in the
jury formation for all trials. Under a 1797 statute, for each civil case, the
clerks drew a panel of twenty jurors by ballot; then the list was delivered to
the parties, each of whom then struck out four names.9 Maryland extended
this procedure to criminal cases in 1802, except for capital felonies or trea-
sons, for which peremptory challenges were allowed.92 Currently, the pro-
cedural rules contain the method for striking names that is used to effectuate
peremptory challenges. In civil cases in the circuit court, each side has four
peremptories (and possibly more, if alternate jurors are empaneled), which
are exercised by striking names off of a list "sufficient to provide the num-
ber of jurors and alternates to be sworn after allowing for the exercise of
peremptory challenges."93 Larger numbers of peremptories are allowed in
criminal cases,94 and striking names off a jury list occurs only if no party
requests alternating challenges. 95
Until 1985, West Virginia law provided that "any court may allow a
special jury in any civil case," and such juries were formed in a typical
manner-twenty names to be drawn, reduced to sixteen by lot, and then
reduced to twelve by two strikes by each party.96 By 1985 amendments, the
numbers were changed to ten, reduced to eight by lot, and then ultimately
reduced to six by one strike each. 97 The original formula was retained,
however, for eminent domain cases.9
The last group of active struck jury states I mention only briefly here. In
Arizona, the rules of civil procedure state that the clerk shall make a list
consisting of as many names drawn from the jury box as the court di-
rects.99 From this list the parties alternate in making peremptory challenges,
until such challenges are exhausted. Failure of a party to make a challenge
in turn acts as a waiver of that party's remaining challenges." From the
list of remaining names the clerk calls the first eight persons to serve as the
pragmatic twist: If the request came outside of term time, the clerk of the circuit court
was authorized to order the struck jury if "satisfied that a struck jury ought to be grant-
ed." Id. § 18. The statute did not indicate the criteria to be applied in deciding whether
to grant the request. See id.
91 See 1797 Md. Laws ch. 87, § 9.




W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13 (1966).
9' See W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13 (a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1991)
's See id. § 56-6-13(b). For eminent domain cases, the twenty names are to be quali-
fied freeholders of the county where the land being condemned is located. See infra
notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
See ARIz. R. CIv. P. 47(a)(1).
, o See ARIz. R. CIV. P. 47(a)(3).
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jury. °' In Texas, the law provides that in all non-death-penalty criminal
cases, "the party desiring to challenge any juror peremptorily shall strike the
name of such juror from the list furnished him by the clerk.""1 2
The occasional use of a struck jury method of choosing jurors in Massa-
chusetts is demonstrated by Commonwealth v. Johnson. 3 In Johnson, the
defendant was convicted of rape, and among his challenges on appeal was a
claim that the trial judge had deprived him of his peremptory challenges by
imposing the "struck jury method" upon him."l The claim was rejected
after the court explained that the "struck method" was not a system for
exercising peremptory challenges, but was, rather, "an alternative method for
selecting a jury," in which
a venire pool of about one hundred members [is] drawn.
After venire persons from the pool are excused for cause or
hardship, the jury are "struck": the defendant strikes two
members of the remaining venire, and then the prosecutor
strikes one member. This process is repeated until twelve
jurors remain, who then serve as jurors for the trial.0 5
Similarly, in the Alaska case of Van Huff v. Sohio,"'° the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using
the "struck jury" method of jury selection; neither was this method viewed
as inconsistent with an Alaska rule for peremptory challenges. Finally, in
Hawaii and California, the use of the struck jury method by trial judges has
been held to be improper because it is inconsistent with the method of jury
selection prescribed by statute, but if the defendant fails to object to the
struck jury method at trial, or if the defendant cannot show prejudice, its use
will not justify reversal of a conviction."
B. States in Which the Once-Authorized Special Jury Is No Longer Valid
New York and New Jersey have especially rich special jury histories,
See ARIz. R. Civ. P. 47(a). In criminal cases, the number of jurors to serve in the
case is to be drawn and then augmented by the number of alternates plus the number of
peremptories allowed each party. See ARIz. R. CRiM. P. 18.5(b).
102 TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 35.25 (West 1989).
103 631 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1994).
104 See id. at 1004, 1007-08.
Id. at 1007 n.7.
106 835 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1992).
"01 See People v. Wright, 802 P.2d 221, 240-41 (Cal. 1990); State v. Echineque, 828
P.2d 276 (Haw. 1992); State v. Corpuz, 880 P.2d 213 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Shiroma, 855 P.2d 34 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993).
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including, for New York, two United States Supreme Court cases. The spe-
cial jury survived in New York until 1965,"° but in a surprising, inverted
way. Although the special jury remained theoretically available in both civil
and criminal cases until its repeal, it rarely was used in civil trials; instead,
its most interesting twentieth-century history was in capital criminal cases.
Most states with early struck jury histories followed England's lead and
withheld the device from capital cases so as not to impinge on the
defendant's right to peremptory challenges. New York, however, fashioned a
unique statute in 1896 that provided for special juries only in criminal cases
and only in two counties-those having a population of more than
500,000.'" Special juries were allowable if necessary for a fair and impar-
tial trial, or because of the "importance or intricacy" of the case."0 Special
jurors were to be chosen from a special list to be prepared by jury commis-
sioners after personal interviews."' In addition to ordinary trial juror quali-
fications, candidates had to have a clean record in the courts, be able to
disregard newspaper publicity, disavow any conscientious objection to the
death penalty, and be able to resist any negative presumption if a defendant
were to decline to testify."'
In a 1960 decision, Schuster v. City of New York,"3 Supreme Court
Judge Henry Martuscello wrote a lengthy opinion denying the defendant's
108 See Laws of 1965, ch. 778, § 3.
o Act of Apr. 23, 1896, ch. 378, 1896 N.Y. Laws 354.
1Id. § 13. Here one can detect an echo of the English trial at bar and of
Blackstone's reference to cases that "were of too great nicety for the discussion of
ordinary freeholders." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 357. Shortly after the 1896
New York special jury statute was passed, Benjamin Tucker gave a speech at the Coo-
per Union under the auspices of several labor unions, constituting a scathing criticism
of the elitist and exclusive effects of the new law. The speech was published in 1889
under the title, A Blow at Trial by Jury. In his opening remarks, Tucker stated that
instead of the actual title ("An Act providing for a special jury in criminal cases in each
county of the State having a certain population, and for the mode of selecting and pro-
curing such special juries; also, creating a special jury commissioner for each of such
counties, and regulating and prescribing his duties"), a more accurate title would have
been:
An act providing for the enforcement of those laws of the State of New York
which, having found their way into the statute-books only through the insidious
machinations of a clique or a cabal or a boss or an interest or a handful of fanat-
ics, are so unpopular with the citizens of the State of New York that a conviction
of the violation of them can seldom, if ever, be secured from a jury fairly and
impartially impaneled from the mass of sober-minded people.
BENJAMIN TUCKER, A BLow AT TRIAL BY JURY 3-4 (New York, Benjamin Tucker
1889).
... 1896 N.Y. Laws 354, § 9.
112 Id. § 8.
113 205 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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motion for a special jury in an action for damages allegedly caused by po-
lice negligence in not preventing an informer's murder. The judge observed
that "the historic purpose for which the special jury was introduced to com-
mon law [was] to provide more intelligent and competent jurors in excep-
tional cases," and he concluded that the case before him was not sufficiently
important or intricate to justify a special jury."' In reaching this conclu-
sion, he expressed his strong distaste for the elitist nature of "blue ribbon"
juries, noting that five separate New York judicial councils or conferences
from 1937 to 1952 had recommended abolition of the special jury."5
Judge Martuscello stated, incorrectly, that special juries "were not authorized
in this state" until the 1896 statute and "were not established in civil actions
until the enactment of Chapter 602 of the Laws of 1901.,,116
In fact, the special jury in civil cases had a much longer history in New
York than 1896. That history is laid out by Morton Horwitz in The
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860."" Horwitz describes "the
'struck' or special jury" as "a favorite institution of colonial merchants" that
the 1741 statute initially authorized and that a 1786 enactment re-endorsed
after independence."' In 1801, however, New York codified a detailed
struck jury procedure that, according to Horwitz, "for the first time placed
struck juries within the judges' control, permitting them only where the
court 'may deem it necessary, by reason of the importance or intricacy of
the case.""' 9
By the time George Caines published his New York practice book in
1808, the special jury had assumed sufficient importance to occupy a full
chapter. 2 Caines quoted the 1801 statute verbatim. Among other things,
the statute sets forth the New York version of the English procedure: In the
presence of the parties, the clerk or his deputy was to copy out of the jury
book forty-eight names, which would then be reduced to twenty-four by
alternate strikes by the parties; the panel of twenty-four would be summoned
for jury service, and on the day of trial, "the jurors so struck shall be called
as they stand upon the panel, and the first twelve of them who shall appear
and are not challenged, or shall be found duly qualified and indifferent,
n4 Id. at 197.
"' Id. at 200-03 (quoting Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 570 (1948) (Murphy,
J., dissenting)).
116 Id. at 196-97. The 1901 statute amended the 1896 act to make it applicable to
both criminal and civil cases in counties with a population of over one million (New
York and Kings).
117 MORTON HORWIrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at
155-58 (1977).
118 Id. at 155. For the 1741 statute, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
19 Id. (citing 1801 N.Y. Laws ch. 98).
120 See GEORGE CAINES, A SUMMARY OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK ch. 43 (New York, Isaac Riley 1808).
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shall be the jury, and be sworn to try the said cause."'' Nothing in the act
called for a special list of, as Judge Martuscello put it, "more intelligent and
competent jurors,"" but the act made the special jury a matter of judicial
discretion in "intricate or important" cases.2 3
Horwitz points out that the 1801 statute led to a number of special juries
between 1801 and 1807, chiefly in marine insurance cases. 4 Thereafter,
however, "we hear no more of merchant juries in New York commercial
cases of any sort," even though the statute remained on the books "and
indeed special juries continued to be used in libel cases."'" In Schuster v.
New York, Judge Martuscello gave the twentieth-century history of the civil
special jury in New York, based on a total of six cases-four in the first
decade, one in 1922, and one in 1935." In declining to make Schuster the
seventh case, the judge wrote:
Juries were intended to serve as instruments of justice. They
cannot fulfill that purpose unless they are truly representative
of the community. There can be no true equal representation
of a community if jurors are selected because of an alleged
economic, social or superior educational status. Responsibili-
ty in our democracy should be shared by all and not a
few ....
Juries of character, courage, and independence can only
exist in an atmosphere where there is no discrimination in
their choice because of social, economic or philosophic rea-
sons.
2 7
These sentiments anticipated, or were in the vanguard of, the "reasonable
cross-section" movement that has since swept the country.2 They are, of
course, open to challenge. It is not self-evident why juries cannot accom-
plish "justice" unless they are truly representative of the community. Pre-
sumably New York would continue to achieve justice in capital criminal
cases while special juries persisted. 29
121 Id. at 456.
'" Schuster v. New York, 205 N.Y.S.2d 190, 197 (1960).
123 Id. at 203.
124 See HORWrTZ, supra note 117, at 155-56.
125 Id. at 157-58.
'2 205 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193-96 (Sup. Ct. 1960). One case involved the valuation of
railroad bonds, which called for "a jury equipped with practical business experience";
two were libel cases; one was a quo warranto to test the validity of the mayor's elec-
tion; and two were probate contests. Id.
127 Id. at 205.
128 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 1.
129 See People v. Willis, 257 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1970) (upholding a murder conviction
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New Jersey adopted its version of the English special jury practice in
1797 and retained it until 1991. The original act validated the granting of a
special jury in any civil case or in any criminal case that did not involve a
right to peremptory challenges. 3 ' When granted, the sheriff was to select
forty-eight men from the jury book-men deemed by the sheriff "most
impartial and indifferent" and "best qualified as to talents, knowledge, integ-
rity, firmness and independence of sentiment."'' The parties then were to
strike out twelve each, leaving a jury panel of twenty-four to be summoned
for trial.' New Jersey made significant changes to this scheme in 1851.
The new law made struck juries available in any civil or criminal case, but
in civil cases the court had to be satisfied (by an affidavit by the party re-
questing the struck jury) that the nature and importance of the matter in
controversy merited the step.' Perhaps New Jersey had encountered the
same thing that had happened in the English courts-tactical special jury
requests by lawyers seeking only to delay proceedings."
Another significant change made in New Jersey in 1851 was to give the
court, in civil cases, the option of ordering a panel of forty-eight to be re-
duced to twenty-four, or a panel of thirty-six to be reduced to eighteen (by
nine strikes per side).'35 The law then remained stable until the end of the
century, when New Jersey revised the formula to require a jury panel of
and finding that the defendant was not deprived of due process because he was tried
before a special jury); People v. Jackson, 231 N.E.2d 722 (N.Y. 1967) (rejecting a
challenge to a special jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution); People v. Horton, 241 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (App. Div. 1963) (up-
holding a special jury conviction, despite the claim that the special jury list excluded
Puerto Ricans: "In a county such as New York, composed of a vast number of minority
groups, it will be almost inevitable that the small number of prospective jurors called
for Special Jury service will not conform in proportion to the percentage of each minor-
ity group in the population."), affid, 221 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 934 (1967); People v. Follette, 306 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (upholding the
use of a special jury drawn from the 1964 New York County Special Jury panels).




,33 New Jersey P.L. 1851, at 92.
134 See Oldham, Special Juries, supra note 17, at 158-59. One of the findings of a
commission of inquiry in London in 1851, the same year as the New Jersey act, was
that "[i]t is well known to be a frequent practice of defendants who wish for delay, to
obtain a rule for a special jury, which practically, in London and Middlesex, has the
effect of postponing the trial." Id. at 158 (quoting First Report of Her Majesty's Com-
missioners for Inquiring into the Process, Practice and System of Pleading the Superior
Courts of Common Law, at 44, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons (1851) xxii,
567); see also supra text accompanying note 68.
135 New Jersey P.L. 1851, at 92.
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ninety-six names, to be reduced to forty-eight by twenty-four strikes on each
side, after which the forty-eight names remaining were to be "placed in the
box," and "the jury' for trial of the case is drawn in the usual way."'36
These numbers, however, must have become cumbersome because New
Jersey changed the law again to assume the form that it retained until 1991;
the enabling language returned to what it was in 1851--discretion in the
trial court to grant a struck jury in any civil or criminal case after the nature
and importance of the case were established by affidavit. 37 When granted,
the order was to "direct the jury commissioners of the county in which the
cause is to be tried to prepare a list of 36 or 48 persons or, in special causes
or in a criminal cause, a larger number of persons"; the parties or their
attorneys were then to strike names until half of the names on the list re-
mained, and the trial jury was to be selected from the remaining names "in
as nearly as possible the same manner as a jury from the general panel is
required to be selected."'"
Over the years, the New Jersey struck jury statutes were tested often in
the courts. In Fowler v. State, 39 for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the struck jury statute was valid under the New Jersey Con-
stitution of 1844 and its guarantee of trial by jury. The court observed that
the struck jury was derived from English law and had been confirmed by
New Jersey legislation in existence when the constitution was passed. 4
Another attack, this time after the 1898 amendments, failed in Brown v.
State.'41 There, the struck jury system was claimed to be inconsistent with
the defendant's right to challenge potential jurors; 4 1 however, the New
Jersey Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the struck list of forty-eight
names had to be given to the defendant at least twelve days before empanel-
ing, providing ample time to ascertain grounds of objection to individual
jurors.'43 Moreover, the defendant was entitled to five peremptory chal-
lenges as the names of the trial jurors were drawn from the box of forty-
eight names.'"
After a period of relative calm, several cases decided in the late 1980s
contested anew the New Jersey struck jury system. Because these cases
dealt with voir dire issues, I will mention them shortly in connection with
136 Act of June 14, 1898, ch. 237, § 76, 1898 N.J. Laws 866, 895, quoted and dis-
cussed in United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 735 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown
v. State, 42 A. 811, 812 (N.J. 1899)).
137 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:75-1 (West 1971).
138 Id. §§ 2A:75-2, 2A:75-5 (West 1971).
139 39 A. 1113 (N.J.), affig 34 A. 682 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1896).
140 Id. at 682.
141 42 A. 811 (N.J. 1899), aff'd, 175 U.S. 172 (1899).
142 See id. at 813.
143 See id. at 818.
144 See id.
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peremptory challenges. 145 Still other cases, scattered across most of the
twentieth century, questioned the struck jury system in terms of its "exclud-
ing" effect-its leaving protected groups underrepresented or unrepresented
in the jury pool. 14 6 Finally, in 1991, New Jersey repealed the struck jury
procedure. 47 Two special applications of the struck jury remain on the
books, but their retention after the 1991 repeal may have been oversight.
48
Because a wide variety of historical patterns has been traced, I will
provide only a brief description of comparable "struck jury" experience in
other states in which the procedure has been repealed. Although this may
not be an exhaustive list, the following states, by region, once had struck ju-
ries: in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic: Pennsylvania and Vermont; in the
South: Georgia; in the Midwest: Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, and Wisconsin; and in the West and Southwest: Nevada and Oklaho-
ma. Some of these states followed the standard English model or a close
variant.4 9 Often the size of the pre-strike panel was smaller than forty-
5 See infra Part I.C.
146 See State v. Gilmore, 489 A.2d 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding
that the assistant prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all black jurors
violated the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury), aff'd, 511 A.2d 1150
(N.J. 1986).
14' Act of Apr. 9, 1991, ch. 91, § 533, 1991 N.J. Laws 329, 610.
148 The two statutes are akin to the procedures later discussed for state condemnation
of land or other property rights. See infra text accompanying notes 251-54. The first of
the two New Jersey statutes in question provides for payments to riparian owners for
uses of or improvements to land under water, and it provides that if the riparian owner
"is dissatisfied with said award he may apply to the Superior Court for a struck jury to
try the question in such place as may be designated by the said court . . . ." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12:3-9 (West 1994). The second statute relates to payments for encroachments
upon cemeteries and provides that, if an objection is raised, "[tihe court may hear any
such objection or proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise and with a
struck jury if any party demands a jury." Id. § 40:60-25.45.
149 See MICH. REV. STAT. tit. XXII, ch. 103, §§ 36, 38 (1846) (requiring that a spe-
cial jury be ordered by a circuit court when it appears "that a fair and impartial trial
will be more likely to be obtained in any cause pending therein, by having a struck
jury," and that a panel of forty-eight deemed "most indifferent" and "best qualified" be
returned and reduced to twenty-four by twelve strikes by each party). In 1929, the num-
bers were changed to a panel of thirty-six, with six strikes per party. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 13856 (1929). This method was authorized until 1963. See People v. Miller,
276 N.W.2d 558, 561 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 307 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. 1981).
As has been true elsewhere, however, the struck jury method continued to have appeal
because of perceived voir dire advantages. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying
text. In Miller, a trial judge's use of the procedure in a murder trial, although violative
of the Michigan jury selection rules, was held to be a nonprejudicial error, insufficient
to overturn the convictions. See Miller, 276 N.W.2d at 561. The Supreme Court of
Michigan, however, held that failure to follow the Michigan jury selection rules, cou-
pled with an appropriate challenge before the jury selection process had begun, required
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eight. 5 ° Surprisingly, however, in Nevada, the pre-strike panel was to
number one hundred, to be reduced to fifty by alternate strikes. 5 ' At the
other end of the spectrum, Iowa in 1851 legislated a six-man struck jury,
reduced from a panel of eighteen,' and in 1873, the parties in a struck
reversal. See Miller, 307 N.W.2d at 337. The court further stated that "the 'struck jury
method' or any system patterned thereafter is disapproved and may not be used in the
future." Id.
In Georgia, a colonial statute provided "that all special juries that shall hereafter be
moved for and allowed by the court shall be struck in the manner now used in the
Courts of Westminster." Act of Dec. 13, 1756. After independence, however, special
juries were tied to grand juries. Special jurors were to be taken from the grand jury list,
and when a special jury was needed, the clerk was to supply the names of grand jurors
then empaneled, which would be reduced to twelve by alternate strikes by the parties.
Judiciary Act, § 27 (1796). This method remained in place until the special jury disap-
peared in Georgia around 1930. Special juries appear in the 1926 Code but are absent
in the 1933 Code.
In Vermont the standard formula (forty-eight names, reduced to twenty-four by
alternate strikes) was followed from 1884 to 1968 whenever it appeared to the judges of
a county court that a struck jury was needed to obtain a fair and impartial trial of an
issue of fact or because of the intricacy, importance, or special circumstances of a case.
See An Act Providing for Summoning Special Juries in Extraordinary Cases in the
County Courts, Public Act No. 117 (1884); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1471, 1474 (1958); Act
of Mar. 14, 1968, § 3, 1967 Adj. Vt. Acts & Resolves, 132, 134.
150 In 1816, Ohio adopted a struck jury statute calling for a panel of forty to be re-
duced by striking to sixteen; of the sixteen, the first twelve to appear in court and not
be challenged became the jury. See OHIO STAT. § 17 (1816). In 1824, this statute was
made inapplicable to criminal cases in which more than two peremptory challenges
were made on either side. See An Act Relating to Juries, c. 580, § 19 (1823-24). This
scheme remained in place until its repeal in 1894. See 91 OHIO STAT. 290 (1894). In
1880, an amendment for counties with a population greater than 200,000 was passed
calling for the presiding judge in the court where a jury was to be struck to select the
names of the special jurors "personally, and without suggestion from anyone." Act of
Feb. 26, 1880, House Bill No. 11, 1880 Ohio Laws 12, 13.
Apart from the large county feature, Minnesota followed the "40 to 16 to 12" for-
mula (reportedly copied from Ohio) from 1864 until its repeal in 1891, see MINN.
STAT. ch. XXXI, §§ 1, 5 (1864), as did Wisconsin (reportedly copied, in turn, from
Minnesota) from 1898 to 1913. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 2544a (1898); Wis. STAT.
§ 2544a (1913). Wisconsin, however, had a simpler struck jury (panel of thirty-six,
reduced to twelve by alternate strikes) from 1858 to 1898. See REV. STAT. Wis. ch.
115, § 9 (1858).
Missouri utilized a formula calling for a much smaller jury panel-eighteen, re-
duced to twelve by alternate strikes of three on each side. See Act of Mar. 17, 1835,
§ 14, repealed by MO. REV. STAT. § 3791 (1899).
" See NEV. GEN. STAT. § 3183 (1861-1885) (1875 amended statute). This statute
disappears from the books in the early 1900s, but I have not located the specific point
of repeal.
152 See IOWA CODE ch. 96, § 1776 (1851). The struck jury was granted at the request
of both parties, and when chosen, it supplanted the parties' right to five peremptories
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jury case were given statutory authority to elect a verdict by majority
vote.' Iowa repealed these procedures in 1927.154
In 1890, the legislature of the Oklahoma Territory passed a statute au-
thorizing a special jury whenever the court's business required it.'55 If or-
dered, the statute provided that "[tihe parties may agree upon the jurors to
compose a special jury."' 5 6 Alternatively, the parties could have the sheriff
return a panel of eighteen, to be reduced to six by alternate strikes; other-
wise, the "40 to 16 to 12" formula used in other states 5 7 was to be fol-
lowed. "'58
In Pennsylvania, the struck jury had a long history, starting in the eigh-
teenth century. Initially authorized by statute in 1785, the special jury sur-
vived until 1937.' By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the sta-
tus of the statutory authorization was uncertain, as is shown by the follow-
ing annotation to the special jury provision in the 1894 Code:
This subject is in a very confused state; but as the right is a
common law one, and the act of 1785 has never been ex-
pressly repealed, it seems safer to insert it. There is certainly
nothing corresponding to the clear irreconcilability that is
necessary to constitute a repeal by implication."
C. The Relationship Between the Struck Jury and Peremptory Challenges
The right to strike a specified number of jurors without giving any rea-
son closely resembles the right to a specified number of peremptory chal-
lenges. In practice, however, the two concepts differ in important ways.
The reason the struck jury was inapplicable to trials of capital offenses
in England in the eighteenth century was pragmatic. The struck jury tradi-
tion that had crept into practice the century before had settled on a jury
panel of forty-eight with twelve strikes on each side, and this did not ac-
each. See id. § 1774.
"' See id. § 2778 (1873).
154 See id. ch. 496, § 11484 (1927), repealed by Act of Mar. 31, 1927, ch. 221, § 1,
1927 Iowa Acts 193.
155 OKLA. CODE (Terr.) ch. 70, § 7 (1890).
I5 Id. Compare the Oklahoma Territory statute with the like provision in Indiana,
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
157 OKLA. CODE (Terr.) ch. 70, § 7 (1890).
158 See id. The Oklahoma statute did not last long; it does not appear in the 1893
Code. I have not been able to mark its exact disappearance.
"' Act of June 25, 1937, No. 419, § 1, 1937 Pa. Laws 2093.
160 PA. CODE ch. IX, Juries, § 81 n.3 (1894).
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commodate a defendant's right to thirty-five peremptory challenges. There is
no apparent evidence that anyone seriously argued for extending the struck
jury procedure to capital offenses by increasing the size of the jury panel
from which names would be struck. Had there been any such attempt, an-
other problem immediately would have come into view.
The struck jury procedure was a preliminary process implemented in the
clerk's office before any jurors whatever had been summoned to the
courthouse. The struck jury tradition was that of striking names off a list,
whereas the tradition of peremptory challenges was one of eliminating per-
sons who had appeared for jury duty and who stood ready to serve. As Jus-
tice Harlan wrote in Pointer v. United States:161
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without
showing cause is one of the most important of. the rights
secured to the accused .... Any system for the empaneling
of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted
exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.
And, therefore, he cannot be compelled to make a perempto-
ry challenge until he has been brought face to face, in the
presence of the court, with each proposed juror, and an op-
portunity given for such inspection and examination of him
as is required for the due administration of justice.'62
Thus it is obvious that the traditional struck jury system fell far short of
the protection intended by peremptory challenges. Changes in court practice,
however, eliminated the problem. A good review of the issue is given by
Judge Winter of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ricks,'63 in which
convicted drug dealers challenged the use of the struck jury system at their
trial by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Judge
Winter explained:
[A]t common law, the veniremen were summoned by the
sheriff after the parties exercised their strikes against the list.
Experience demonstrated that twenty-four veniremen were
usually necessary to ensure that at least twelve persons ap-
peared .... The rationale for summoning more than the
minimum number required to draw a jury does not exist
today where the veniremen are summoned and are present in
16 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (approving a struck jury system).
162 Id. at 408-09.
163 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
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the courtroom before any exercise of peremptory challeng-
es. MA
Under modern practice, therefore, the struck jury method can satisfy statuto-
ry rights to peremptory challenges. Indeed, the method is widely viewed
from the criminal defendant's vantage point as superior to the traditional
"jury box" method. As the Second Circuit explained in United States v.
Blouin:165
Within the Second Circuit, both the "jury box" and the
"struck jury" methods are used. The goal of the "jury box"
system is to fill the box with twelve acceptable jurors, and
the system is indifferent whether the parties use all their
challenges before acquiescing in a panel, or waive all chal-
lenges and accept the first twelve called. The goal of the
"struck jury" is to whittle down an initially selected group of
normally twenty-eight candidates (twelve jurors plus sixteen
challenges) to twelve survivors, and it therefore builds in a
preference for the parties' exercising all their allotted chal-
lenges. This difference in procedure highlights the different
outlooks of the two systems. The "jury box" system tends to
focus the parties' attention on one member of the venire at a
time, as he or she is seated in the box, and prompts the
parties to ask, "Is this juror acceptable?" The "struck jury"
system, by contrast, emphasizes the overall complexion of
the panel and suggests the very different question, "Which
twelve of these twenty-eight will be most favorable to my
side?"
By permitting full comparative choice among a panel of
twenty-eight prospective jurors, the "struck jury" system lets
the parties make the most effective use of their challenges, in
the sense that through their choices they are able to deter-
mine from the initial panel not only who will not serve but
also who will serve as the petit jury .... The "jury box"
system does not afford the opportunity... of full compara-
tive choice, for the parties do not know ahead of time who
the replacement for a challenged juror will be.1"
'6 id. at 734-35.
165 666 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
166 Id. at 798.
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With this explanation in mind, it will not be surprising to learn that
convicted criminal defendants have raised on appeal the claim that they have
been deprived of the full and effective use of their peremptories when the
struck jury method of empaneling the jury was not used at trial.'67 In the
Blouin case, for example, the court, although admitting that the struck jury
method "affords a more 'effective' opportunity for the use of peremptories
than the 'jury box' system," held that both systems fell within trial court
discretion and that neither was mandatory. 168
Sometimes the challenge on appeal is the opposite-that the use of the
struck jury method somehow deprived a defendant of the full effect of his
peremptories. These challenges also fail. In People v. Miller,69 the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals lost its patience, stating, "We cannot accept the con-
tention that defense counsel could not keep track of the responses of the
prospective jurors. The struck jury method has been used and continues to
be used in other jurisdictions and the attorneys there handle the situa-
tion."' 70 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected a defendant's
protest that "the struck jury method is inconsistent with the Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 47(d) because that rule provides for the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges as to jurors in the box, and under the struck jury method
peremptory challenges are exercised before jurors are seated in the box.'' 7.
The courts, however, continue to face new issues about the struck jury
system. In United States v. Ricks,7 2 a divided Fourth-Circuit observed that
"from the historic operation of the struck jury system and from the careful
recitation of facts showing that in each case upholding its validity, the num-
ber of veniremen supplied to counsel did not exceed the number of jurors
actually required plus the authorized number of peremptory challenges" and
held that such a limitation on the size of the panel "is an essential require-
ment of a valid struck jury system."'73 The dissent called this "a new rule
that affects every criminal trial in this circuit"-a rule that prior authority
refuted and that worked against the "fair cross-section of the community"
goal. 74 In operation, at least in the state courts, struck jury panels often
have been qualified that were larger than the number that would be pro-
duced by the Fourth Circuit's formula.
75
167 For representative cases from New Jersey, see State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887 (N.J.
1988), and State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
168 See Blouin, 666 F.2d at 799.
169 276 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 307 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. 1981).
170 Id. at 561.
171 Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Alaska 1992).
172 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
17. Id. at 736-37.
174 Id. at 737-39 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
17' New Jersey cases are again illustrative. See State v. Perry, 590 A.2d 624, 631
(N.J. 1991) (qualifying "approximately fifty-four" jurors); State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022,
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The history of the struck jury does not support the viewpoint of either
the majority or the dissent in Ricks. The limitation that the majority articu-
lated cannot be found in "the historic operation of the struck jury.' 76 Even
though, as the dissent stated, "[a] large venire... enhances the likelihood
that the jury will include a fair cross-section of the community,"'" that
goal was never a rationale for the struck jury. The struck jury originated in
civil cases, and it gave the parties some degree of control over jury com-
position that they otherwise would not have had.'78 In doing so, the struck
jury concept was cousin to the "jury of peers" in that it allowed parties
some leeway to pick jurors sympathetic to their lifestyles and circumstances.
At least in theory, the same can be said of peremptoriesY9 Regardless of
whether the number of strikes is limited to the number of peremptories, the
struck jury formula is not complementary to the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement. The struck jury formula is a protection for litigants, while the
cross-section requirement is a device to protect the citizens' right to serve
on juries."'
II. THE SPECIAL JURY COMPRISED OF JURORS WITH SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS
It is not radical to hope to fill juries with capable people. Early statutes
explicitly made the point. Statutory requirements customarily called for
jurors to be "well-informed,"'' or "most indifferent" and "best-quali-
fied."' 82 These formulations typically accompanied other general qualifica-
tions such as property ownership. As I have noted, however, the special jury
1028 (N.J. 1988) (qualifying forty-eight potential jurors); State v. Halsey, 526 A.2d
1165, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (qualifying fifty-six potential jurors by the
court before striking began). For an example of a formula that is limited in the way the
Fourth Circuit describes, see the Arizona criminal procedure rule, supra notes 99-101.
176 Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736.
Id. at 739 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
178 Indeed, the opportunities for control became, in the views of some, opportunities
for improper jury packing. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF
PACKING AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1821).
179 Some believe that this theoretical justification for peremptories has been mangled
in practice beyond recognition. See HAROLD J. ROTHwAx, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 203-07 (1996). Rothwax is a New York judge and former criminal
defense attorney who observes that criminal defense attorneys attempt to exploit the
jury selection system by seeking "jurors who will not or cannot intelligently evaluate
evidence." Id. at 200-01.
1go See infra text accompanying notes 292-311.
161 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1874); KAN. COMP. LAwS ch. 54, § 2 (1879).
182 See the Michigan statute, supra note 149, and the Indiana statute, supra note 86.
One Indiana jury commissioner testified that he tried to make sure that jurors had been
"somewhat successful in life." Shack v. State, 288 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. 1972).
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was often thought to be a "blue ribbon," or "high-class," jury, somewhat in.
the tradition of the grand jury."3 This is only one of at least four types of
"special qualification" juries represented in American jury traditions and
practices, each of which is discussed below.
A. The "Blue Ribbon," or "High-Class," Jury
In the United States, the practice of empaneling "gentlemen of the better
rank"' was ordinarily an unwritten custom,8 5 although sometimes a
statute explicitly required it. In one instance, the practice was explicitly tied
to the grand jury.
In New Jersey, the 1797 statute authorizing the struck jury specified that
the sheriff was to select as the struck jury panel the forty-eight persons from
the jury book that he thought were "most impartial and indifferent ... and
best qualified as to talents, knowledge, integrity, firmness and independence
of sentiment, to try the said cause ... ,, 6 Indeed, the 1929 amendment
that dropped these qualifying words was unsuccessfully challenged in court
as unconstitutional.
87
In Georgia, the special jury was expressly linked to the grand jury. From
1796 until 1914, Georgia statutes required special jurors to be taken from
the grand jury list." Grand jurors, in turn, were to be "the persons most
able, discreet and qualified."' 8 9
The struck jury procedures in New York are those that have been most
notoriously associated with jurors "of the better rank."'" The procedures
twice came before the United States Supreme Court in the 1940s-in Fay v.
183 For a description of the grand jury tradition as it existed in England in the seven-
teenth century, see Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 162-64.
"u See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
"8 The Tennessee Code of 1843-44 authorized the circuit courts in any civil case, on
motion of either party, to empanel a special jury. In construing this statute, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court explained that this section "contemplates the selection of men with
reference to their superior competency and fitness to try and determine the particular
issues involved in the case." Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 447, 453 (1892). Interestingly,
the court added that the special jurors were not to be selected with reference to their
relationship to the parties in nationality or color and that it was error for the trial court
to select one-half of the jury from among colored persons upon the motion of a colored
party litigant, solely because they were colored. Id.; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 279.
186 Act of Nov. 10, 1797, § 15 (relating to juries and verdicts).
187 See State v. Donato, 148 A. 776, 780 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
188 See Judiciary Act § 35 (1796). In 1914, the statute was amended to allow special
jurors to be selected from either the grand or traverse jury, at the discretion of the
judge. See GA. CODE ANN. art. 8, § 852 (Park 1914).
189 Judiciary Act § 28 (1796).
190 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17.
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New York 9' and Moore v. New York.'92 Both times the Court barely up-
held the special jury statutes by a five-to-four vote, over strongly worded
dissents by Mr. Justice Murphy. In Fay, Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, explained: "Special jurors are selected from those accepted for the
general panel by the county clerk, but only after each has been subpoenaed
for personal appearance and has testified under oath as to his qualification
and fitness."'93 Justice Jackson reviewed the prior unsuccessful attacks on
the New York special jury because of its restrictive composition, after which
he turned to the proof presented in the case before the Court. Tabulations
and studies of New York jury questionnaires claimed to show that laborers,
operatives, craftsmen, foremen, service employees, and women were sys-
tematically excluded from the special jury panel. The Court was not con-
vinced that the statistics proved "that the jury percentages are the result of
discrimination,"'94 stating that "petitioners adduced no evidence whatever
that the occupational composition of the general panel is substantially differ-
ent from that of the special"' 95 and that women had an absolute exemption
from jury service should they wish to exercise it, which apparently they
often did.'96 Dissenting Justice Murphy, anticipating later developments,
thought that the "blue ribbon" jury "denies the defendant his constitutional
right to be tried by a jury fairly drawn from a cross-section of the
community."'97 Justice Murphy admitted that "[t]here is no constitutional
right to a jury drawn from a group of uneducated and unintelligent persons"
or "chosen solely from those at the lower end of the economic and social
scale,"' 98 but he observed that the jury "is a democratic institution, repre-
sentative of all qualified classes of people," so that the jury lists had to
include persons "with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with
varying economic and social positions."'' He continued the argument in
the Moore case, characterizing the New York special jury panels as "com-
pletely at war with the democratic theory of our jury system, a theory for-
mulated out of the experience of generations.""
332 U.S. 261 (1947).
192 333 U.S. 565 (1948).
193 332 U.S. at 267 (citing N.Y. Judiciary Law § 749 (McKinney 1946)).
'94 Id. at 276.
'9 Id. at 276-77.
16 See id.
197 Id. at 298.
198 Id. at 299.
'9 Id. at 299-300.
2 0 333 U.S. at 570. Other challenges to the New York special jury statute on
grounds similar to those presented in Fay and Moore cases were rejected by the Second
Circuit. See United States ex rel. Torres v. Mancusi, 427 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1970). The
juries in these cases were empaneled before the repeal of the New York blue ribbon
jury statute in 1965. The argument in Mancusi was interesting; the defendant claimed
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The repeal of the New York blue ribbon jury statute in 1965 ended the
chapter in United States history that expressly permitted the formation of
trial juries from special lists of persons in the upper echelons of society. It
is not surprising that this chapter happened or that it is now closed; never-
theless, the idea of special juries of experts persists. Because experts typical-
ly are highly educated, most of them fall within the upper end of the socio-
economic spectrum. It is usually less objectionable, however, to think of
selecting special jurors from this segment of society when those jurors are
chosen for their expertise, rather than solely because of their social standing.
B. The Jury of Experts
The notion of bringing experts into dispute settlement processes makes
good common sense and has an extensive history. Perhaps the best known
example is the use of experts as arbitrators. The idea of expert decision
makers is also at the heart of the extensive network of quasi-adjudicatory
administrative agencies that have flourished since New Deal days. Another
example is the formation of specialty courts, such as a commercial court2 1
or the United States Court of Patent Appeals.2 2 Neither the private arbitra-
tor nor the administrative judge, however, need worry about submitting
questions of fact to a jury. Specialty courts must do so, continuing to recog-
nize the preserved right to jury trial embodied in the Seventh Amendment,
comparable state constitutional provisions, and statutes.,
The courts have responded to some extent to the robust debate in legal
literature about the constitutionality of dispensing with the jury in complex
civil litigation.2 3 By and large, the argument that a "complexity excep-
tion" can be carved out of the Seventh Amendment has not succeeded.23'
that the jury had a large number of educated and well-to-do people on it and "was less
well equipped than a general jury would have been to pass judgment upon his offense,
which he represents was a crime of passion committed by a man of underprivileged
background, frail in health, of low intelligence, and who had been working at poorly
paid menial jobs." Id. at 169.
20" Louisiana, for example, once formed a commercial court. See infra note 218.
202 Patent appeals are now part of the responsibilities of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
o See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 138 n.5; M.S. Arnold, A Historical Inqui-
ry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829
(1980).
204 That the issue remains alive, however, is shown in the patent case of Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afftd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
The Federal Circuit decided that in a patent infringement action, questions of patent
claim construction and interpretation were exclusively questions of law for the court and
that neither the Seventh Amendment nor precedent required these questions to go before
a jury. See id. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, affirmed.
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One alternative, as earlier noted,2 5 is to revive and expand the use of the
special jury and to utilize jurors equipped by education or training to under-
stand the complex issues in dispute. This idea is currently on the statute
books in Delaware. Before discussing Delaware's statutory provisions, how-
ever, I will lay out the historical use of special juries of experts.
The most common historical example, following the English experience,
is the use of the "merchant jury" for commercial cases. There was such a
chapter in New York law, as earlier explained.' South Carolina and Loui-
siana also utilized the "merchant jury."
In addition to discussing New York's use of the "merchant jury," Mor-
ton Horwitz summarized the South Carolina history in The Transformation
of American Law 1780-1860.' According to. Horwitz, "[e]ven more than
in New York, merchant juries seem to have exerted a powerful influence
over the course of development of post-revolutionary South Carolina com-
mercial law."2' He gives several examples of the power of merchant ju-
ries during the 1780s and early 1790s (their heyday in South Carolina)
authorized by a colonial statute of 17 6 9 ' and allowed on the court's own
See Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In the Federal Circuit opinion, Judge Mayer, con-
curring in the judgment for different reasons, protested that the majority opinion marked
a bizarre "sea change in the course of patent law" that was "of a piece with a broader
bid afoot to essentially banish juries from patent cases altogether." Markman, 52 F.3d at
989 (Mayer, J., concurring). He characterized the majority decision as threatening "to
do indirectly what we have declined to do directly, that is, create a 'complexity
exception' to the Seventh Amendment for patent cases." Id. at 989, 993. In the Supreme
Court opinion, Justice Souter, after disposing of the constitutional issue, observed that
complicated patent issues can be handled better by judges than by juries. See Markman,
517 U.S. at 388. Nevertheless, applying the historical test for the scope of the Seventh
Amendment jury trial guarantee, the Court concluded that a jury would not have decid-
ed the patent claim issue in England in 1791. See id. at 379-80. In my view, the Court's
conclusion was incorrect, but that is a topic for another day.
2 See supra note 21.
See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text. One twentieth-century example
cited by Judge Martuscello in Schuster v. City of New York, 205 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct.
1960), was the case of Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 46 Misc. 492 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1905). The case involved valuation of railroad bonds, and the trial court granted a
motion for a special jury on the ground that the issue should be determined by a jury
"of intelligence and of practical business experience ... the best which any established
method of selection may secure." Id. at 493. Indeed, the court stated that "each juror
should have much of the capacity for financial analysis which a successful reorganizer
of railroad properties may be deemed to possess." Id. at 494.
201 MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1977).
208 Id. at 158.
' See id. The statute allowed special juries, on consent of both parties or motion of
one willing to pay the cost, in cases involving much money or "concerning trade, and
disputes with merchants." Id.
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motion by an Act of 1791.21°
The Library of Congress holds a privately printed volume containing
South Carolina jury lists from 1778 to 1779.211 These were copied from
original handwritten lists in the South Carolina archives and are broken
down by judicial districts, as shown on explanatory maps. Three categories
are tracked-grand jurors, petit jurors, and special jurors. Special jurors
comprised thirty-eight percent of the total number of jurors in Charleston,
whereas in other districts the percentages ranged from two percent to eight
percent. Clearly the use of special juries of merchants in the commercial
center of South Carolina was well-established by the time of American
independence, and probably earlier. As Horwitz has pointed out, however,
parties began to use special juries as a delay tactic, and in 1797, South
Carolina passed a statute that limited special juries to cases in which both
parties consented."' Thereafter the special jury trail goes cold. Presumably
the use gradually died out.
213
Louisiana is another jurisdiction with a history of actively using mer-
chant juries. In 1807, Louisiana passed a statute that proved to be unique in
United States history by allowing the trial judge to appoint special jurors
who had expertise relevant to the litigated dispute. The statute provided:
In all cases when the judges shall be of opinion that the
matters to be submitted to the decision of a jury, are of such
a nature as to require certain information peculiar to certain
occupations or professions, then and in that case the judges
are empowered, at the request of either party, to direct to be
summoned a sufficient number of jurors; being of the occu-
pation, profession or trade, an acquaintance with which is
more particularly necessary for the decision of the cause. 4
210 Act of Dec. 1791, No. 1526 (altering and amending the South Carolina law re-
specting juries of 1769 and instituting additional regulations to the Acts for establishing
and regulating the circuit courts).
211 GELEE CORLEY HENDRIX & MORN McCoY LINDSAY, THE JURY LISTS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 1778-1779 (privately printed n.d.).
212 See HORWITZ, supra note 207, at 159; Act of Dec. 1797, No. 1665 (abolishing the
right of trial by special jury, except by consent of both parties).
213 See HORWTZ, supra note 207, at 159. As Horwitz has pointed out, standard print-
ed sources show no special juries in use after 1796, but they likely were used with the
consent of both parties in cases with no printed record or in cases that were reported
but in which there was no occasion for the reporter to note the fact that the jury was
special. See THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 257 (New York, T. & J.
Swords 1810) (describing how the special jury lists in Charleston and other districts are
to be fashioned, even though the description that had been in the 1788 edition (at page
291) of the empaneling of special juries pursuant to the 1769 statute no longer appears).
214 Act of 1807, ch.23 (authorizing a special jury in certain cases).
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The experience in Louisiana with this statute (which was repealed in 1823
and reinstated in 1831) is described by Richard Kilbourne in Louisiana
Commercial Law.215 According to Kilbourne, the statute, after its revival in
1831, "remained viable during the antebellum period and even appears in
John Ray's Digest of 1870. ''216 He attributes this longevity to facts pecu-
liar to New Orleans-its civil law tradition, the dependence of its economy
on international trade, and the concomitant traffic in commercial paper.1 7
His own examination of juries summoned during the first three years of the
Commercial Court,"' from 1839 to 1842, showed a large percentage of
merchants even when the juries were not special. This abundance of mer-
chants was due primarily to the fact that often merchants were the only men
who met the qualifications for regular jury service.219
After the Commercial Court was eliminated in 1846, the preeminence of
merchants on juries, both special and ordinary, undoubtedly dwindled.
For several decades, however, the experience with merchant juries in New
Orleans represented the closest approximation in the United States to Lord
Mansfield's use of merchant juries to incorporate mercantile practices into
the common law.22' Kilbourne names many of the prominent commission
merchants, brokers, bankers, directors of insurance companies, and directors
of the chamber of commerce who served as jurors.2 22 Moreover, he notes
that "[p]ermitting juries of merchants ... to generate their own laws with a
stamp of approval on trade practices had important economic repercus-
sions.,2
23
Delaware also has a rich history of special jury use. As earlier ex-
plained, the Delaware statute passed in 1987 allows a special jury to be
ordered "upon the application of any party in a complex civil case. ' '2' The
Delaware Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of special juries in In
re Asbestos Litigation.22 The court concluded that "qualifications of jurors
and the exercise of peremptory challenges, which are the distinguishing
21 R. KILBOURNE, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 101-05
(1980).
216 Id. at 101.
217 See id. at 102.
218 This court lasted in New Orleans from 1839 to 1846. See id. at 85.
219 See id. at 102-03.
See id. at 102-03, 106-07.
22 See id. at 26-28, 102-05; see also supra note 16.
See id. at 103-04.
223 Id. at 102-04.
22A DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (1987).
2 551 A.2d 1296 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988). In reaching its conclusions, the superior
court leaned on the 1982 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court that upheld the con-
stitutionality of the special jury statute then in effect. See id. at 1298 (citing Haas v.
United Techs. Corp., 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982)).
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characteristics of the special jury procedure, are not constitutionally protect-
ed."226 The statutory change in 1987 that converted the Delaware special
jury from a matter of right to a matter of court discretion was legiti-
mate.227
In reaching this conclusion, the Delaware court briefly reviewed the
English special jury background, including Blackstone's reference to "causes
of too great nicety for discussion of ordinary freeholders .... "' The
court also noted that "[t]he use of special jurors who had particular knowl-
edge or experience in the subject of the trial had been customary in England
from early times."229 At various stages in Delaware, jurors were required
to be "the most discreet and judicious freeholders," "sober and judicious
persons of fair characters," and "qualified to vote at the general elec-
tion., 23" No special statutory requirements differentiated special jurors
from common jurors in England." In Delaware, they were to come from
the general jury lists and were to be (initially) the "most indifferent" and
"best qualified" or (later) "indifferent and judicious citizens. 232
Presumably the Delaware legislature, in making the 1987 change in the
special jury law, intended both to make the special jury more exceptional by
making it discretionary, and to respond to the perceived problem of relying
on ordinary juries in complex civil cases. No guidance, however, was given
about what constitutes a complex civil case, or for that matter, about how
special jurors are to be selected whenever a special jury is ordered in such a
case.
The several reported cases that have used special juries or that have
responded to motions for special juries under the new law show that the
new law may lead more to confusion than clarity. A growing distaste for the
special jury option among superior court judges may be discernible. In four
Delaware cases, the court denied motions for special juries, all on the
ground that the cases before the court were insufficiently complex. One of
these cases, Amoroso v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,23' was a product liability
case involving a heavy air compressor, and the court, reasonably enough,
saw no complex issues. Less straightforward was a series of asbestos cases
in which special jury motions were denied,2 despite the fact that in a pre-
226 Id. at 1297.
See id. at 1297, 1300.
See id. at 1297; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
229 Id. at 1298.
230 Id.
231 See id.; see also supra notes 26 and 33 and accompanying text.
232 In re Asbestos Litigation, 551 A.2d at 1298. The latter requirement ended when
the special jury law in Delaware changed in 1987. See id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4506 (1987).
23 No. C.A. 86C-MY-189, 1987 WL 26911 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1987).
' See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc., Nos. 84C-MY-145, 85C-FE-10, 1989 WL
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vious trial the jury had been called upon to render its verdict by answering
thirty-six pages of interrogatories and that one scheduled case might require
jury answers to interrogatories from fifteen or more defendants. The court
pointed out that many of the answers would be the same as to the various
defendants, and prior verdicts in other cases "demonstrated that the issues
which are presented in these cases are well within the comprehension and
capabilities of jurors who come from the ordinary panels of jurors. 2 35 The
court explained its meticulous habits to assist ordinary juries, pointing out as
well that "[m]ost areas of science can be described in such a way that they
can be understood by people of ordinary intelligence, education and experi-
ence," for example, "by avoiding overly technical words and expressions
(particularly of Latin origin) and using less erudite verbiage." '236 Respond-
ing to defendants' reliance on an article entitled The Case for Special Juries
in Toxic Tort Litigation,237 in which the author argues for special juries
formed by a system of specific education and experience standards, the
court wrote:
The use of jurors who have expertise which relates to the
case also presents problems. One is that many cases involve
more than one area of expertise. Another is that in many
specialties, experts do not subscribe to a single philosophy or
approach, and therefore, the decision could be slanted toward
one predetermined philosophy or another and not dependant
upon the evidence presented at trial. The use of experts as
jurors could well produce a more prejudiced system of jus-
tice than does the traditional jury system.2 '8
The court also observed that the proposed scheme would represent a method
of selection that is "contrary to fundamental principles of jury trial" and
"inconsistent with established principles of justice," requiring "statutory and
perhaps constitutional modification." '239
Yet another motion for a special jury was denied in Noramco (Dela-
ware), Inc. v. Carew Associates, Inc.24 The court was not impressed by
the argument that the construction dispute estimated to occupy a two-week
70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989).
211 Id. at *1.
236 Id. at *3.
" Dan Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE
292 (1989).
238 Bradley, 1989 WL 70834, at *3.
I d. One prior statutory authorization in the United States came close to the pro-
posed scheme-the 1807 Louisiana statute. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
240 No. C.A. 85C-MY-54, 1990 WL 199509 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990).
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trial would involve the proverbial "battle of the experts." 241 The court not-
ed that "[t]he better experts have learned to be able to speak understandably
to lay people," adding, "That the expertise may be complex does not neces-
sarily mean that the case is a 'complex civil case.' 242
When a special jury is granted, a new question occurs-one that seems
obvious in retrospect, but that may not have been anticipated. A question
arises regarding whether the standards for the admissibility of expert testi-
mony require upward adjustment because of the supposed greater capabili-
ties of the special jurors. This question came before the Delaware Superior
Court in Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,243 a libel case presenting
an "actual malice" issue. The plaintiff proposed that a Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist, professor, and author testify about journalistic standards.2" Dow
Jones filed a motion in opposition, arguing, among other things, that the tes-
timony should be rejected because "the subject of the testimony is within
the comprehension of the average special juror in this case." 245 The Dela-
ware Superior Court acknowledged the test set forth by the Delaware Su-
preme Court:
Knowledge is specialized only when not possessed by the
average trier of fact who lacks the expert's skill, training or
education. Consequently, expert testimony impermissibly
invades the province of the jury if it embraces matters in
which the jury is just as competent as the expert to consider
and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclu-
sions.2
Despite case authority from other jurisdictions holding that journalism stan-
dards were well within the reach of ordinary jurors, the court was "not
persuaded that members of a special jury are sufficiently knowledgeable of
the standards and practices of investigative journalism so as to render expert
testimony on the subject useless."247
The future of the 1987 Delaware special jury statute remains uncertain.
In addition to the cases discussed above, a recent product liability case
241 Id. at *1.
242 Id. The court also wondered why the parties had not followed a common path in
the case by seeking expertise through arbitration, adding that "[t]he application for a
special jury here may result in having 'expertise' the parties did not freely contract for."
Id.
243 No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL 28311 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987).
244 See id. at * 1.
245 Id.
246 Id. (quoting Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987)).
247 Id.
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against General Motors also used the special jury. 48 The Delaware Siperi-
or Court, in Ramada Inns, published by slip opinion the following method
agreed upon with counsel for the selection of the special jury:
1. The parties shall submit to the Court a list of witnesses
likely to be called at trial ... for the Prothonotary's use in
furnishing notice to jurors.
2. The Prothonotary shall promptly identify potential special
jurors and shall send the appropriate special jury question-
naire to those persons identified.
3. After receiving the responses to the juror questionnaires,
the Prothonotary shall select one hundred persons who are
qualified as special jurors ....
4.... [T]he Prothonotary shall provide the Court and coun-
sel with (a) a list of the names of the special jurors selected
and (b) a copy of the responses by those individuals to the
special jury questionnaire.
5 .... [T]he parties shall file any written challenges for
cause on the ground that individual jurors selected by the
Prothonotary do not qualify as special jurors. Any party
objecting to such a challenge shall not file a written response
but shall reserve his objections until the hearing conducted
by the Court or until the prearranged teleconference.
6. The Court shall conduct a hearing in the Court or over the
telephone .... At that time the Court will consider the
written challenges and any oral opposition to those challeng-
es. The Court will rule on each challenge at that hearing.
7. The parties will have the right to exercise peremptory
challenges at a date to be determined during the pretrial
conference .... Each side may exercise up to, and includ-
ing, six peremptory challenges.
8. After the exercise of the peremptory challenges the
Prothonotary shall promptly summon the remaining jurors to
appear at the first day of trial ....
9. The jury and alternates in this case shall be selected from
the remaining array in the same manner as juries are selected
in non-special jury cases.4 9
M See McLain v. General Motors Corp., 569 A.2d 579 (Del. 1990).
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL 28311
(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987).
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C. Juries for Property Condemnation and Diking District Assessment
Disputes
1. Next Neighbors
In this discussion of special qualifications for special jurors, I have
considered both the "blue ribbon" jury and the jury of experts. I now turn
briefly to two features of the larger history of the jury. The first is the origi-
nal notion that jurors were to be "next neighbors" who ought to be in a
position to know something about the dispute and the parties, instead of
being disinterested strangers requiring proof of facts. The theory was that by
being "next neighbors," the jurors would be able to get to the bottom of the
dispute effectively. 2"
There is one species of jury statute that survives to the present that still
retains the flavor of this ancient notion-statutes that require juries to decide
valuation disputes caused by property condemnations effected through emi-
nent domain for public works (usually highways) or resulting from diking
district assessments. The West Virginia statute requires the jurors to be "qu-
alified freeholders" in the county where the property in dispute is locat-
ed."5 These are the only civil juries in that state still requiring twelve
members, determined by the parties' alternate strikes of four each from a
panel of twenty freeholders. 52 The language of the Washington state stat-
ute allows the court to "call a special jury ... and direct that a jury panel
be selected and summoned ... from the citizens of the county in which the
lands ... sought to be appropriated are situated, as many qualified persons
2 253as may be necessary in order to form a jury of twelve persons ....
Colorado has codified an interesting variation, circling back to the spe-
cial jury with expertise, for juries in drainage district assessments. To re-
solve a disputed assessment, the statute provides that the district court shall
"cause to be summoned six landowners living outside of the drainage dis-
trict, who are not interested in any lands or work in said district, or of kin
to any of the parties interested," and "[t]he six landowners shall be men
who have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drainage. 254
250 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 173.
25' W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13(b) (1997).
252 See id.
2" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080 (West 1992). The parties to such a dispute in
Washington can consent to a jury of less than twelve, but no smaller than three. See id.;
see also id. § 85.06.120 (West 1995) (setting forth procedures for juries to resolve
disputes about diking district assessments).
254 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-23-104 (1997). The continued statutory reference to
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2. Juries De Medietate Linguae
The second feature of the broader history of the jury previously men-
tioned is the "half-and-half' jury and its kinship to recent arguments calling
for racial quotas for juries in racially charged cases. 5 The "half-and-half'
jury-the jury de medietate linguae-was part of the early jurisprudence of
several states."6 This type of jury required that jurors have the special
qualification of being foreigners. Judge Henry Toulmin's rationale bears
repeating:
The fundamental principle of this institution [trial by jury] is,
that a man should be tried by his peers or equals, a common-
er by commoners and a nobleman by nobles; and so liberal
was the extension of this principle even in the 14th century,
that by the 28th of Edward III, ch. 13, it was provided, that
in inquests to be taken between aliens and English subjects,
one half of the jury should consist of aliens, and the other
half of English subjects. We have a similar provision in our
,,257Own statutes ....
Often, however, a practical difficulty arose-that of finding six foreign-
ers from the defendant's own country. The solution was for the empaneling
officer to try his best to find jurors from the defendant's own country, but to
resort to any foreigners, as necessary. According to an 1803 New York
practice book:
Juries and inquests between aliens and citizens of the United
States . . . , the one half shall be citizens of this
state, ... and the other half aliens, if so many there be in
the city or county where such jury or inquest is to be taken,
and who shall be indifferent between the parties; and if there
be not so many aliens or strangers, then as many as shall be
found .... ,,258
"men" is obviously obsolete.
" See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
256 See KY. REV. STAT. ch. 55, art. III, § 5 (1852); Statute of Oct. 1788, § 44, re-
printed in XII W.W. HENING, LAWS OF VIRGINIA 746 (1823); Respublica v. Mesca, 1
Dall. 73 (Phila. Oyer & Terminer Sept. Sess. 1783).
27 H. TOULMIN, THE MAGISTRATE'S ASSISTANT 140 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell 1807);
see supra text accompanying note 7.
218 A NEW CONDUCrOR GENERALIS 257 (Albany, D. & S. Whiting 1803).
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In contrast, an 1810 South Carolina Justice of the Peace manual stated that
the sheriffs in a trial of an alien were to "summon 18 subjects of the nation
of such alien, if they may be had, or the subjects of any other nation (except
subjects of Great Britain during the war) .. .
It is doubtful that today's calls for racial quotas for juries in racially
charged cases-the modem counterpart to the jury de medietate-will be
enacted into law. Interestingly, however, the concept was officially recom-
mended in England. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice issued its
Report in July 1993, paragraph 62 of which reads as follows:
We are reluctant to interfere with the principle of random
selection of juries. We are, however, anxious that everything
possible should be done to ensure that people from the eth-
nic minority communities are represented on juries in rela-
tion to their numbers in the local community. The pool from
which juries are randomly selected would be more repre-
sentative if all eligible members of ethnic communities were
included on the electoral roll. Even if this were to be
achieved, however, there would statistically still be instances
where there would not be a multi-racial jury in a case where
one seemed appropriate. The Court of Appeal in Ford held
that race should not be taken into account in selecting juries.
Although we agree with the court's position in regard to
most cases, we believe that there are some exceptional cases
where race should be taken into account.'
Almost uniformly, case law and secondary literature in England prior to the
Royal Commission's Report opposed the idea of racial quotas.26' In the
Ford case referred to by the Commission, the Court of Appeal ruled that "in
the absence of evidence of specific bias, ethnic origins could not found a
259 SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 252 (New York, T.& J. Swords 1810).
The passage in the 1810 edition is the same as that in the 1788 edition at page 288
(Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son).
260 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 133 (London, HMSO
1993) (footnote omitted).
261 See R. v. McCalla, 1986 CRiM. L. REV. 335 (Stoke-on-Trent Crown Ct. 1985); R.
v. Bansal, Bir, Mahio and Singh, 1985 CRIM. L. REV. 151 (Maidstone Crown Ct. 1984);
R. v. Danvers, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 680 (Nottingham Crown Ct. 1982); A. Dashwood,
Juries in a Multi-Racial Society, 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 85. In one case in 1981, a judge
on the Bristol Crown Court ruled that, notwithstanding the apparently preclusive word-
ing of the Juries Act 1974, he had discretion to manipulate jury selection to achieve
racial balance when it appeared that this would not be achieved through the use of pe-
remptory challenges. See R. v. Binns, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 522 (Bristol Crown Ct.
1981).
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valid ground for challenge to an individual juror," and that a judge does not
have discretion to remove a potential juror solely on that ground, not even
in the interest of achieving racial balance on the jury.262 In a 1995 speech
to the Leeds Race Issues Advisory Council, the Lord Chief Justice of Eng-
land stated his opposition to the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
proposal, calling it "the thin end of a particularly insidious wedge."263 He
viewed the proposal as a dangerous departure from the time-honored prac-
tice of random selection of jurors. In the Lord Chief Justice's opinion, mem-
bers of the jury should not be regarded "as representing the views of the
community, or of discrete parts of it, nor indeed of 'representing' either the
complainant or the defendant."'
III. THE SPECIAL JURY, THE "REASONABLE CROSS-SECTION"
REQUIREMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
Jeffrey Abramson has observed that "[t]he cross-sectional jury is so
familiar to us today that we forget how modern is its triumph."6 5 He cata-
logues the march of the idea, from infancy in the 1960s, to the Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act of 1968, to the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
Taylor v. Louisiana,26 which raised the concept to constitutional stature
under the Sixth Amendment.267 Abramson gives this summary appraisal:
"To say, as the Supreme Court did in its landmark 1975 decision, that only
'representative' juries are 'impartial' juries is to suggest a new way of think-
ing about how to make jurors capable of impartial justice-a way that
stands the classical view of impartiality on its head.""26
Abramson's appraisal is correct. The fundamental change in opinion that
occurred regarding the selection of juries was a shift away from rules that
promote fairness to the parties to a lawsuit, especially defendants in criminal
cases, to rules that are perceived as promoting fairness to society at large
and its democratic traditions. The classical model was shaped to produce
unbiased jurors who could decide cases unencumbered by any personal
agendas. Occasionally-as in the "half-and-half' jury-this was leavened by
a desire to be as fair as possible to a defendant, by having some jurors
equipped to understand and empathize with the defendant's cultural and
262 Regina v. Ford, 1 Q.B. 868, 873 (C.A. 1989); see also Dashwood, supra note
261, at 828.
263 Frances Gibb, Lord Chief Justice Rejects Jury Race Quota as Insidious, TIMES OF
LONDON, July 1, 1995 (quoting the Lord Chief Justice Taylor).
264 Id.
265 ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 99.
26 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
267 See ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 99-125.
268 Id. at 100.
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linguistic background. The new model jettisoned this idealism, adopting a
brand of realism that frankly acknowledged the existence of sharp ethnic,
gender, and racial divisions in society. The best way to account for these
divisions in jury composition is to ensure that all clearly identifiable, "cog-
nizable" groups are fairly represented in the jury pools. This way, in the
aggregate, the biased votes by jurors of the various interest groups eventual-
ly will cancel each other out.269
The next logical development dealt with peremptory challenges. If we
insist on a fair cross section of the community in the jury lists that generate
jury panels, surely it is wrong to allow a party to tamper with the chance
that various cognizable groups will find representation on particular juries.
Thus it is wrong to allow the exercise of peremptory challenges solely to
eliminate blacks, other racial or ethnic groups, or women. A series of Su-
preme Court decisions established this proposition in the 1980s and 1990s:
Batson v. Kentucky270 (disallowing peremptories based solely on race);
Powers v. Ohio27 (holding that Batson applies regardless of whether jurors
eliminated are of the same race as the defendant); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.272 (holding that Batson applies to civil cases as well as crim-
inal); Georgia v. McCollum273 (holding that Batson applies to defense
counsel as well as to the prosecution); and J.E.B. v. Alabama74 (holding
that the Batson principle precludes using peremptories to eliminate jurors
solely because of their sex). Unsurprisingly, Batson led to a call for the
elimination of peremptories altogether, on the theory that they are incon-
sistent with the cross-section idea.275 A closely divided Supreme Court,
however, refused to eliminate peremptories completely in Holland v. Illi-
nois,"' reasoning (in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia) that the con-
stitutional principle at work seeks jury impartiality, not cross-section
representativeness on specific juries. Abramson is nevertheless correct in
concluding that "the present position of American law on peremptory chal-
lenges is incoherent." '277 He adds that "[h]aving taken the first step of pro-
269 See id. at 100-01.
270 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
271 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
272 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
273 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
274 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
" See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103-08; Rodger L. Hochman, Note, Abolishing the Pe-
remptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1367 (1993);
Jeffery S. Jubera, Note, The Peremptory Challenge at the Federal Level and in Mary-
land: Its Uncertain Future After Georgia v. McCollum, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 225
(1993); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory
Challenges, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1996).
276 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
277 ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 139.
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hibiting race and sex as grounds for peremptory challenges, the Supreme
Court has little logical choice but to take the second and decisive step of
banning all uses of peremptory challenges that target specific groups for
exclusion from the jury."'27
Regardless of whether the current position of American law on peremp-
tory challenges is incoherent, one should ask what the implications of the
new law are for whatever life may be left of the special jury. If the Supreme
Court were to adopt a quota of a specified number of black jurors in a ra-
cially charged case, a new special jury would exist because at least some of
the jurors would be required to have special qualifications. This is not likely
to happen; the idea is out of fashion with the political temper of the times
and is incompatible with the cross-section concept. 279
Short of the racial quota notion, what are the implications of the new
jury rules for the special jury? Clearly the restrictions preventing the dis-
criminatory use of peremptories apply to the "struck jury" method of jury
selection and to the "jury box" method.' 0 It may be easier, however, to
camouflage discrimination with the struck jury model because the demo-
graphics of the entire panel will be known from the start, making it easier to
pick and choose. A party hoping to eliminate women from a jury may avoid
a charge of intentional sex discrimination by merely eliminating most of the
women, allowing one or two who seem least objectionable to stand.
Alternatively, the opportunity to discriminate, provided by advance
knowledge of the entire panel, could supply real meaning to the "jury of
peers" idea. By strategic striking, it often may be possible for a criminal
27 Id. In Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983), the court noted:
Although the distinctiveness of a group for sixth amendment purposes is a ques-
tion of fact, . . . [c]ertainly, a court can determine as a matter of law that a group
is not cognizable or distinct. For example, no evidentiary hearing would be need-
ed to determine that redheads or vegetarians are not distinctive classes within the
sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis." Id. at 1217.
Despite the assurance of the Eleventh Circuit, the lines are ever moving. For example,
one can imagine a future argument, in litigation involving animal rights protests, that
vegetarians should represent a cognizable class.
279 The Supreme Court considered and rejected the quota idea in 1879 in Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). As Abramson has explained, "the defendants moved prior
to their trial to have the panel of available jurors modified so that it would-be one-third
black," a motion "premised on the existence of an affirmative right to have blacks actu-
ally included on the jury (that is, to have blacks represented in rough proportion to their
population in the county)." ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 106. Thus, "the Virginia
defendants' motion ... was a claim that society was so cleaved along racial lines that
the jury had to be also." Id. Although the Supreme Court rejected this notion in 1879,
the idea is not far from the customary rationale given for the cross-section requirement.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
2.0 See, e.g., Lemley v. State, 599 So.2d 64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied,
1992 LEXIS 817 (Ala. June 12, 1992).
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defendant to have some jurors from his own race or socio-economic circum-
stances. This possibility falls short of the "affirmative peremptories" argued
for by one writer,"1 but it moves in the same direction.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ricks28 2 presents another open
question. 3 District courts within that circuit now must tailor their struck
jury method so that the panel is no larger than the number of trial jurors
required plus the total applicable number of peremptory challenges.' It is
unclear whether federal courts in other circuits, or state courts, will adopt
this limitation.
Because the cross-section idea pertains to both civil and criminal cases,
as do the new rules on peremptory challenges, new questions arise regarding
the use of special juries comprised of jurors with special qualifications.
Despite an extensive history in the United States, this practice occurs only
in Delaware and in the few states with statutes prescribing special qualifica-
tions for jury service in real estate condemnation or drainage district dis-
putes. The number of juries convened for condemnation or drainage district
disputes is undoubtedly quite small, and it is unlikely that a serious chal-
lenge to those statutes will arise. Were such a challenge to occur, however,
the circumstances should be sufficient to justify an exception to the cross-
section concept. Sustaining, for example, the Colorado statute calling for six
jurors who "have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drain-
age"'" would have the effect of excluding large segments of the commu-
nity from jury service in drainage district disputes, but this outcome should
not be viewed as evil or impermissible. The cross-section requirement and
the limitations on peremptories need not blot out the view of the two-plus
centuries of American jury tradition. That history was built upon fairness to
parties in litigation, a perspective that should not be lost. It would be sense-
less to return to the elitist days of blue ribbon juries and prescriptive dis-
qualifications from jury service. The reasonable cross-section concept is now
rightfully prevalent and strong. It is strong enough not to be shaken by
exceptional jury composition procedures when special circumstances justify
them.
The Delaware special jury statute, as implemented in the Ramada Inns
case, is again illustrative.' In Ramada Inns, the special jury was assem-
bled through the use of questionnaires designed to produce a panel that
could handle a complex civil case. Can such a special jury be valid? The
answer should be yes. What is prohibited is intentional discrimination,
281 See Ramirez, supra note 11.
282 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
283 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
24 See Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736-37.
2s See supra text accompanying note 254.
" See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
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which a selection process that used neutral criteria shaped by the needs of
the case would not demonstrate. This is true even if the criteria could be
shown to have a disparate impact on "cognizable classes" entitled to be
proportionately represented on the jury rolls. This practice parallels the
realm of employment, where specific business needs justify neutral selection
criteria in hiring and promotion despite disparate impact on classes protected
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.287
The Delaware practice in Ramada Inns calls on the parties to stipulate
under court supervision to a procedure to produce the special jury panel and
to select the trial jury. The superior court does not seem to have responded
to the advice that the Delaware Supreme Court offered in Haas v. United
Technologies Corp.28 In upholding the pre-1987 special jury statute, the
court called upon its power under the Delaware constitution to supervise the
administration of justice, and commended to the superior court "the delicate
and difficult task of drafting a rule of court stating the criteria and guidance
for the selection of special juries to ensure 'a cross section of the population
suitable in character and intelligence for that civil duty.' '' 8 The Delaware
Supreme Court admonished the superior court to "be mindful of the twin
goals of achieving a fair representation of the community on the jury panel
while providing for intelligent, educated and competent jurors for the adjudi-
cation of complex cases."29 The Supreme Court concluded:
We offer as a suggestion, and without fettering the Superior
Court's discretion in this matter, that jurors be randomly
selected from a special jury pool comprised of individuals
meeting specified age, intelligence and educational require-
ments and, to the extent deemed legally permissible by the
superior court, possessing special occupational skills. Perhaps
a minimum educational requirement of a bachelor's degree
from an accredited college or university might be one of
those criteria.2 91
The superior court probably has chosen the wiser course by handling each
case ad hoc rather than trying to write a rule of court for all cases. Several
factors support this course of action, including the discretionary nature of
the special jury in Delaware since 1987, the uncertainty among Superior
Court judges about when a case is complex enough to merit such a jury, and
287 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (comparing a neutral selection
process in the use of peremptory strikes to employment discrimination).
2.. 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982).
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the palpable tension between a jury pool composed along the lines suggest-
ed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Haas and a jury pool conforming to a
cross section of the community.
CONCLUSION
The current prevailing philosophy about jury composition, the "reason-
able cross-section" requirement, is ahistorical. The history of jury composi-
tion rules and practices before American independence and in the following
centuries, especially those creating or permitting special qualifications for
jurors to decide particular types of cases, demonstrates this fact. Such rules
and practices define the special jury. Although the term "struck jury" was
often used as if synonymous with "special jury," many struck juries were
merely juries formed in a specific way, different from the traditional "jury
box" method, with no statutory or customary second feature calling for ju-
rors to have special qualifications. The typical special jury in both English
and American history was a struck jury composed of persons of the better
rank, merchants, or others with special capabilities that facilitated under-
standing the dispute in question.
The rationale behind the typical special jury has always been to improve
the decision-making process. In some states, courts have the power to order
a special jury when the nature of a particular dispute .calls for it, but ordi-
narily one or both parties will request a special jury. A party's request for a
special jury was a matter of right (although the requesting party might have
had to bear any extra cost), or a matter of court discretion. The fundamental
point, however, is that the special jury aids the parties or the court.
Occasionally one encounters a claim that the reasonable cross-section
requirement also aids defendants. For example, in State v. Gilmore, a New
Jersey court wrote: "While defendant in the present case has no right to
insist that Blacks serve on his trial jury or that there be proportional repre-
sentation of Blacks on the jury,... he does have the unqualified right to be
tried by a fair and impartial jury," and the New Jersey Constitution defines
that jury as "a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the commu-
,,292
nity.
This formulation illustrates the air of unreality that so often infects jury
discourse. If a black defendant truly were entitled to a jury drawn from a
representative cross section of the community, that jury would include some
black members. In fairness, however, the New Jersey court recognized the
292 489 A.2d 1175, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (citation omitted), aft'd,
511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 197-99 (discussing
Justice Murphy's dissent in Fay v. New York).
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following realistic appraisal by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Wheeler:293
[A] party is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as
near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the com-
munity as the process of random draw permits. Obviously he
cannot avoid the effect of that process: the master list must
be reduced to a manageable venire, and that venire must in
turn be reduced to a 12-person jury. The best the law can do
to accomplish those steps with the least risk to the repre-
sentative nature of the jury pool is to take them by random
means .... We recognize that in a predictable percentage of
cases the result will be a wholly unbalanced jury, usually
composed exclusively of members of the majority group.
This is inevitable, the price we must pay for juries of a
workable size.294
In cases governed by a statutory or constitutional cross-section require-
ment, the traditional special jury, one drawn from a distinct group of spe-
cially qualified jurors, is not permissible. The cross-section requirement
protects the rights of the population at large, not those of the parties to a
lawsuit or those of the judicial system.295 Skirmishes will continue over
what constitutes a "cognizable group," such that it should be a part of the
cross section, and what constitutes an impermissible basis for the exercise of
peremptory challenges,296 but judicial support for the cross-section require-
ment is strong. As the Fifth Circuit baldly stated, "the desire for competency
must not be pursued to the extent that a fair cross-section is prevented."297
293 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
294 Id. at 762.
295 See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992).
29 In addition to race and sex, claims have been made based on age, education,
economic status, and religion. See generally Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366
F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993); Casarez v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
297 Rabinowitz, 366 F.2d at 55. The court quoted from the recommendations of the
September 1960 Judicial Conference, as follows: "Any attempt to gain competent jurors
that would result in a less representative cross-section than a choice from the statutorily
qualified pool destroys the 'right' Congress intended to confer." Id. at 55 n.53 (referring
to the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1861, "Qualifications of Federal jurors," effected by
the Civil Rights Act of 1957).
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In a 1947 opinion denying a special jury, the Bronx County Court quot-
ed former New York Governor Herbert Lehman's address to the Legislature:
"I recommend that Blue Ribbon Juries be abolished. The use of special or
so-called 'Blue Ribbon' juries is not consonant with the preservation of the
constitutional right to a trial by jury of peers. It is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society."'
What did Governor Lehman mean? Did he suppose that a democratic
society cannot, under any circumstances, allow competence to prevail over
representativeness, anticipating the recommendation of the 1960 Federal
Judicial Conference?299 Even if so, special juries in civil cases have been
commonplace throughout most of the history of this democratic society.
Other juror qualifications that dilute the purity of the "trial by peers" ideal
also pervade history. That ideal, moreover, points logically toward a desti-
nation that the courts and most commentators have resisted-the mandatory
presence on a trial jury of some persons empathetic toward the parties, espe-
cially criminal defendants. As a legal commentator wrote recently, "no con-
stitution or law guarantees a right to trial by a jury of one's racial
peers."
Occasional voices still call for a return to something like the "half-and-
half' jury of an earlier era in order to make the jury-of-peers idea realistic
in some cases." 1 These voices are likely to remain lonely as two cases
29 PNeople v. Brandenberg, 75 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Bronx County Ct. 1947); see also
supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Murphy's dissent in the
Moore case); supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware
Superior Court in the Bradley case).
299 See supra note 297.
31 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Making Juries Look Like America, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Aug.
7, 1995, at 19. The author comments on the case of State v. Harris, 660 A.2d 539 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), in which the court held that, just as constitutional policies
limit a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular
race from a jury, these policies "also require a trial court to consider racial demo-
graphics in exercising its authority ... to change the venue of a criminal trial or to
impanel a foreign jury." 660 A.2d at 543. The court explained:
If a trial court disregards racial demographics in selecting a county for a change
of venue or as the source for impanelling a foreign jury, resulting in a jury pool
with a significantly smaller percentage of a racial minority than would be generat-
ed in the county where the crime was committed, it will reduce the likelihood that
the jurors ultimately selected will be members of different groups whose "respec-
tive biases ... will tend to cancel each other out" in the course of jury deliber-
ations.
Id. at 543 (quoting State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1158 (N.J. 1986). According to
Taylor, the holding in Harris "should not be seen as a first step toward racializing jury
selection in general. It can and should be cabined to the context of venue changes and
foreign juries . . . ." Taylor, supra, at 19.
30" See supra note 11; see also supra text accompanying note 260 (discussing the
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dealing with Spanish-speaking jurors demonstrate. In Hernandez v. New
York," 2 a jury, from which all Latinos had been eliminated at voir dire,
convicted the defendant of attempted murder. The jury composition resulted
from the prosecution's use of its peremptories to eliminate all potential
jurors who spoke Spanish. The defense challenged this behavior as an im-
proper exclusion of Latinos from the jury pool. Although there was no ma-
jority opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected the challenge. Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Scalia), language-based pe-
remptory strikes are not the same as racially based strikes: "That is the
distinction between disproportionate effect, which is not sufficient to consti-
tute an equal protection violation, and intentional discrimination, which
is." 3 Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
Souter acknowledged the possibility that, in some circumstances, language
ability might properly "be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal
protection analysis."' 3 4 They did not find this possibility justified, howev-
er, on the specific facts of the case before them. 5
Following Hernandez, the Third Circuit in Pemberthy v. Beyer' con-
cluded that peremptory challenges based on language ability are not
"equivalent for equal protection purposes to the types of challenges prohibit-
ed in Batson and related cases."' 7 The court, however, cautioned that
"[b]ecause language-speaking ability is so closely correlated with ethnicity,
a trial court must carefully assess the challenger's actual motivation even
where the challenger asserts a rational reason to discriminate based on lan-
guage skills."3"8
From the standpoint of the history of the special jury, the significance of
Hernandez and Pemberthy is their demonstration of how far the law has
moved away from our jury heritage. In the "half-and-half' jury, the jurors'
ability to communicate in the defendant's language was at least one reason
supporting the belief that foreign jurors were needed to ensure a foreign
1993 recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice).
302 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990), affid, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). Hernandez has been the
subject of extensive legal commentary. For interesting early examples, see Deborah A.
Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service,
1993 WiS. L. REV. 761 (1993); Note, Peremptory Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Ju-
rors: Could Hernandez v. New York Happen Here?, 23 N.M. L. REV. 467 (1993).
303 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375.
3 Id. at 371.
' See id. The theory of the prosecution in striking Spanish-speaking prospective
jurors was to eliminate those jurors who might disregard translations introduced into
evidence of testimony or documents given or written in Spanish, favoring instead their
own translations.
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defendant a fair trial. Neither Hernandez nor Pemberthy, however, discussed
the relationship between the ability of potential jurors to speak Spanish and
the fairness owed the defendants by the jury trial guarantee. The interest at
stake was that of the potential jurors.
Hernandez and Pemberthy nevertheless may provide support for the use
of higher education as a juror criterion, such as in the selection of
Delaware's special juries in complex cases. If attorneys can strike jurors
because they speak Spanish, likely eliminating at least three out of four of
the Hispanics or Latinos in a jury pool, 309 then attorneys can select educat-
ed jurors even if the education criterion has a disproportionate racial or
socio-economic impact. In 1967, Judge Botter of the Superior Court of New
Jersey wrote in response to a complaint about the method for selecting
grand jurors:
I think that legally in the discretion of the jury commission-
ers a higher education standard can be used for the selection
of persons to serve on the grand jury .... [W]e may talk
about broad economic or social classes. I'm not cer-
tain ... that the grand jurors, do not represent a fair cross-
section of economic classes.' In any case,... [i]f you accept
the proposition that a higher educational standard can proper-
ly be used, then you cannot accept the corollary that the use
of a higher educational standard must produce intentional
discrimination.310
This philosophy elevates competence over representativeness and, there-
fore, may not be permitted whenever the reasonable cross-section require-
ment applies.3 ' If such a requirement is not preclusive, however, history
supports the continuation of experiments with other models, just as Dela-
ware has done. The jury is a remarkably rich and resilient tradition. The
richness of that tradition should not be disregarded altogether to achieve the
abstract satisfaction of jury lists representative of cross sections of commu-
nities. More often than not, little correlation will exist between the reason-
able cross section and the composition of a particular jury. It is easy to
understand the conceptual appeal of the link between the reasonable cross-
section idea and democratic traditions. The reasonable cross-section idea,
however, need not be all consuming. Other formulas, especially those
shaped to achieve fair and intelligent verdicts in specific cases, have
achieved historical legitimacy and should be allowed a reasonable coexis-
tence.
See Ramirez, supra note 302, at 789-90.
310 State v. Rochester, 253 A.2d. 558, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1967).
311 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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